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 ABSTRACT 
 
Risk management is an important aspect of helping households avoid and escape chronic poverty 
throughout the world.  In many settings, women and their dependents are disproportionately negatively 
affected by poverty and shocks, suggesting particular applicability of improved risk management.  Index-
based insurance products are an innovative approach to risk management that circumvents difficulties 
associated with transactions costs and information asymmetries that plague standard insurance products in 
developing countries.  General demand for index-based insurance products remains limited despite its 
theoretical strengths, and very little is known about women’s demand.  This paper examines the 
relationship between gender and demand for index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) among Boran 
pastoralists in southern Ethiopia.  It uses three years of household survey data and a series of qualitative 
interviews to investigate which demand factors for IBLI vary by gender.  Results suggest that, though 
IBLI appears to be equitably accessed by men and women alike, the factors determining access may 
indeed vary by gender.  Risk aversion and informal insurance influence IBLI demand differently for men 
and women.  At the same time, baseline differences in financial literacy and herd size have a negative 
impact on women’s demand, but lower education and smaller shares of income from livestock have a 
positive effect on IBLI demand by women.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 Multiple studies demonstrate how, in the developing world, women and their children are 
disproportionately negatively affected by household-level shocks (Dercon and Krishnan 2000, Hoddinott 
2006, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2000, Dercon and Hoddinott 2005, Behrman 1988, Rose 1999).  In a 
majority of these studies, low-income households exhibit larger intra-household inequalities relative to 
higher income households, suggesting that poor women and their children experience shocks more 
profoundly than their wealthier counterparts do.  As a result, women are overrepresented among the 
world’s poor and vulnerable and therefore may benefit disproportionately from improved risk 
management (Banthia et al. 2009). The social norms and institutions that render women’s physical, social 
and economic vulnerabilities different than those of men may, at the same time, impact their access to 
innovative products designed to mitigate the long-term detrimental effects of shocks, such as 
microinsurance.  Index-based livestock insurance (IBLI), designed to protect against catastrophic 
livestock loss due to drought, is one such product, and the question of whether and how access to IBLI 
coverage varies by gender remains unexplored.  Understanding what determines access to IBLI by gender 
can shape strategies to equitably provide access to this and other innovative risk management products. 
 Unlike standard insurance, index insurance contracts are not designed around policyholders’ 
actual losses, but around an exogenous index that is supposed to be highly correlated with policyholders’ 
losses.  In the case of IBLI, the index was originally designed for a pilot program in northern Kenya using 
longitudinal data on herd mortality statistically fit to remote-sensing data known as Normalized 
Differenced Vegetation Index (NDVI), that depicts the vegetative conditions (i.e., greenness and 
brownness) in these difficult-to-reach areas (Chantarat et al. 2012).1 When the cumulative deviation of 
NDVI from mean levels predicts livestock mortality rates beyond a given threshold—the “strike”—
                                                        
1 NDVI images used in the construction of the IBLI contract has resolution of 8km2 and is taken every 10 days from 
a U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association satellite used largely for weather forecasting (Chantarat et al. 
2013).  
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insurance payouts are triggered. Compensation varies linearly with the size of the predicted loss. IBLI has 
been subsequently adapted to southern Ethiopia, where the index is based solely off of NDVI measures, 
without any forecasting of livestock mortality rates.  
This type of index is particularly useful in developing country settings where insured amounts 
tend to be relatively small in relation to the transactions costs associated with executing a contract in an 
environment with limited infrastructure.  Information asymmetries that plague insurance products (i.e., 
moral hazard, adverse selection) may be more likely to exist in remote parts of the developing world due 
to poor infrastructure and monitoring capacity.  Given high transactions costs and information 
asymmetries, it is easy to understand why relatively few formal insurance products are marketed to low-
income individuals in the developing world.   
 Despite its potential to overcome difficulties associated with more standard insurance products, 
demand for IBLI and similar products has been weaker than expected (Jensen, Mude and Barrett 2014).  
One key difference between standard insurance products and index-based products that may explain poor 
demand is basis risk.  Basis risk is the mismatch between a policyholder’s actual losses and the losses 
predicted by the index, which can result in the policyholder being compensated for losses he or she did 
not experience or experiencing losses without receiving compensation.  The degree to which basis risk is 
a concern varies among index insurance products, and is relatively poorly understood (Miranda and Farrin 
2012).   The relationship between basis risk and demand for index products has been investigated in 
multiple contexts (Giné et al. 2008, Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012, Jensen, Barrett and Mude 2014). 
Conventional wisdom holds that basis risk has an inverse relationship with insurance demand, but the 
magnitude of the effect remains largely unknown, given few studies on this to date (Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig 2012, Jensen, Mude and Barrett 2014). 
 Basis risk aside, theory and prior empirical work suggest that other primary determinants of 
demand for index-based products include price, trust, credit constraints, understanding of the product and 
the consumer’s attitude toward risk (Hill et al. 2011, Giné et al. 2008).  A willingness to pay field 
experiment and ex ante simulation of IBLI performance suggests that the availability of coping strategies, 
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a household’s expectation of loss and herd size are key determinants of demand for IBLI specifically 
(Chantarat 2009).  
 To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies of gender and demand for index insurance 
products specifically, though several studies of demand include gender controls with no significant effect 
found.  However, in environments where men have higher financial literacy, greater control over assets, 
more education and access to information, one might expect differential access to innovative risk 
management products between men and women. In northern Kenya, more than half of IBLI purchases are 
made by women (ILRI 2012).  In Ethiopia, roughly 20 percent of purchasers are women, which 
corresponds to the proportion of households that are female-headed.  Virtually all purchases in Ethiopia 
were made by household heads. 
 This study exploits the overlap between purchasers and household heads in Ethiopia to 
understand determinants of IBLI demand that may vary by gender using household-level panel data and a 
series of qualitative interviews.  Building on previous empirical findings, I posit that risk aversion, 
informal insurance, product education and female-held assets are particularly relevant to women’s 
demand for IBLI.  Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, I find no gender 
difference in overall demand for IBLI, but that there are subtle differences in drivers of demand by 
gender. I find gender-differentiated average marginal effects of informal insurance access and high risk 
aversion on the IBLI purchase decision and level of purchase, respectively.  Lower baseline levels of 
financial literacy and herd size have a negative effect on IBLI demand, while women’s lower education 
and smaller shares of income from livestock have a positive effect on IBLI demand. 
 The remainder of the paper begins with a review and discussion of key elements of insurance 
demand and gender, followed by descriptions of the study setting, data.  I then discuss qualitative findings 
related to model specification before moving on to the estimation strategy and interpretation of results.  
After a final discussion of synthesized results and methodological reflection, I conclude with implications 
for further research. 
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KEY ELEMENTS OF INSURANCE DEMAND AND GENDER 
Risk aversion 
 A consumer’s attitude toward risk should be a key determinant of his or her willingness to pay 
(WTP) for insurance. However, in the case of index insurance, the presence of basis risk may confound 
this theoretical positive relationship between risk aversion and insurance WTP.  If the factors that drive 
IBLI’s basis risk have a gender dimension, then we could expect to see gender gender-differentiated 
responses to equal levels of risk aversion.    
 Much empirical and experimental work has attempted to determine whether there is a relationship 
between gender and risk aversion and, if so, what the underlying mechanisms of the relationship are.  In a 
review of studies of gender and risk aversion Eckel & Grossman (2008) note that despite numerous 
findings consistent with the hypothesis that women are more risk averse, there remain many studies with 
inconclusive findings on the question. Measures of risk aversion and its associated characteristics, such as 
perceptions of risk, are likely highly sensitive to context and risk domains (Weber et al. 2002).  Not all 
studies adequately control for difficult-to-measure traits like confidence, while many fail to control even 
for income or wealth.  These factors may drive gender differences in risk aversion.  The vast majority of 
studies on gender and risk aversion have taken place in experimental settings at American or European 
universities, often with relatively low stakes.  Given the sensitivity of risk aversion measures, caution 
should be exercised in applying findings from one context to another.   
 One study of risk aversion in the Ethiopian highlands found no difference in risk preferences 
between men and women (Yesuf & Bluffstone 2009), though these results may not be generalizable to 
pastoralist Ethiopia given the substantial difference between the two settings.  In the context of index 
insurance, Giné et al. (2008) find no relationship between demand and gender, but they suggest an 
interaction effect between risk aversion and knowledge in that risk averse individuals with little 
knowledge of the product are less likely to purchase than those with greater knowledge.  In cases where 
women’s knowledge of the product is systematically lower, this could translate to a gender effect 
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associated with risk aversion.  Similarly, a gender difference in perceived risk of, say, drought, could 
translate to a gender effect on demand that operates through risk aversion.  Given the lack of consistent, 
generalizable findings on gender and risk aversion, the relationship between gender, risk aversion and 
demand for livestock insurance remains an empirical question. Any differences in the impact of risk 
aversion on IBLI uptake by gender may be attributable to inadequate controls for product understanding, 
differences in trust of the product or insurance company.  We can expect the effect of risk aversion on 
IBLI uptake to vary by gender, but the direction of the effect remains ambiguous.   
 
Informal insurance  
 Informal risk management institutions exist in virtually every society and include kin networks 
based on reciprocity, indigenous lending organizations and similar arrangements designed to mitigate the 
impact of shocks, either ex ante or ex post.  The effect of informal insurance on demand for formal 
insurance products remains an empirical question.  Studies on the coverage of informal risk management 
institutions, both aggregate and differentiated by income, have repeatedly shown that informal insurance 
falls short of fully protecting households against covariate shocks and performs only slightly better in 
protecting against idiosyncratic shocks (see Morduch 1999, Bhattamishra and Barrett 2010 for reviews), 
but whether informal insurance is a substitute for or a complement to index insurance is unclear.  Where 
index insurance protects households against covariate shocks, it may serve as a complement to informal 
mechanisms that protect against idiosyncratic shocks and a substitute for informal mechanisms, such as 
remittances, that protect against covariate shocks. 
 To what extent do informal mechanisms among Boran pastoralists in southern Ethiopia cover 
idiosyncratic risk?  Lybbert et al. (2004) suggest that idiosyncratic risk dominates among Boran 
pastoralists and that livestock transfers offer only limited insurance coverage.  Santos and Barrett (2011) 
find that that informal loans of cattle among Boran pastoralists function as a safety net rather than as 
insurance in that loans are given contingent on the borrower’s expected gains from insurance rather than 
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the borrower having experienced a shock. These two cases suggest that informal mechanisms weakly, if 
at all, insure Boran pastoralists against idiosyncratic or covariate risk.  
 Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013) consider participation in informal networks in the context of 
index insurance where basis risk is present.  They find that participation in networks that cover 
idiosyncratic risk, as opposed to the covariate risk targeted by index insurance, interacts with basis risk to 
affect demand for the index insurance product.  Where basis risk driven by idiosyncratic risk is high, 
index-based products complement informal insurance participation, but where basis risk is low informal 
risk sharing has no effect on demand.  If idiosyncratic risk is poorly covered by informal mechanisms 
IBLI is unlikely to complement informal insurance.  If that is the case, then informal insurance should 
have a negative or no effect on demand for IBLI. 
 While none of the above findings pertain specifically to gender, women’s risk might be less 
covered or differently covered by informal institutions than that of men, due to differences in wealth or 
social connectedness.  Even if IBLI were to cover covariate shocks perfectly over a given index area, 
women’s experience may be more or less like the average of the index area.  If gender is correlated with 
something that makes women different from the average, such as social connectedness, this could drive 
levels of idiosyncratic losses.  
 Additionally, access to informal groups and networks is not exogenously determined and thus the 
most vulnerable might be excluded from some informal insurance arrangements due to their inability to 
keep up with reciprocity arrangements or pay entry costs (Santos and Barrett 2011, Cohen and Sebstad 
2005, Bhattamishra and Barrett 2010).  A gender effect operating through variation in wealth or social 
networks may be evident in econometric analysis if adequate measures of these attributes are not 
included.  It is also important to remember that heterogeneity within female-headed households likely 
plays a role, as the marital status of a female household head is likely correlated with her wealth and the 
nature of her social networks.  If female-headed households and male-headed households are engaged in 
different types of informal insurance or experience different levels of coverage, they may exhibit a 
different demand pattern for an index-based product. 
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IBLI product education 
 The challenges of marketing a sophisticated insurance product to remote communities with high 
illiteracy and limited prior exposure to formal insurance cannot be understated, as consumer 
understanding of how the product works is essential to making the decision to purchase. Thus, marketing 
of index-based insurance products necessarily involves an education component.  Many microinsurance 
products are marketed in conjunction with financial literacy training, the success of which varies widely, 
suggesting a need for further research on the best ways to present information on insurance (Dror et al. 
2012, Matul 2013). When information channels are male-dominated and women are difficult to reach, 
gender sensitivity in marketing and education matters for uptake by women (Banthia et al. 2009).  
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that women do not have access to the information they want about 
IBLI, but it is not clear whether this is a gender-specific phenomenon. Women’s community involvement 
and market participation is clearly on the rise (Hertkorn 2013, McPeak et al. 2011), suggesting that the 
extent to which women are able to access information channels may also be in flux.  The successful 
education of women about IBLI hinges upon specific strategies for accessing women and increasing their 
understanding of IBLI.  We would expect that education via female-accessible channels would have a 
stronger positive association with IBLI uptake by women than by men.   
  
Female assets and bargaining power 
 Asset holdings have implications for avoiding chronic poverty and, worldwide, women tend to 
command fewer assets than men (Deere and Doss 2006).  Pastoralist regions in Ethiopia are consistent 
with this.  In this setting, livestock is the primary asset, but intra-household ownership arrangements are 
complex.  Within the household, decision-making about livestock management might fall to some 
individuals, while the rights to livestock products might fall to others, and still others may control 
livestock products for sale (Kristjanson 2012, Hertkorn 2013).  Previous work investigating gender and 
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livestock ownership focuses almost exclusively on household-level livestock ownership in relation to the 
gender of the household head rather than intra-household ownership arrangements.  McPeak et al. (2011) 
suggest that male-headed households in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya are more likely to own all 
types of livestock, while female-headed households are more likely than male-headed households to own 
no livestock at all, but the intra-household details of these ownership arrangements are not clear.  McPeak 
et al. emphasize, however, that many female-headed households report both owning livestock and buying 
livestock, in some cases more than male-headed households.  
 Although in pastoralist Ethiopia, ownership is not clearly articulated, it can be argued that women 
hold special rights over animals that are lactating, because milk production and caring for young animals 
falls squarely into the female domain in these societies (Coppock 1994, McPeak et al. 2011).  Lactating 
animals thus generate a large portion of the female income stream.  During drought, men and stronger 
animals travel to areas with better pasture, leaving lactating and young animals behind with women and 
children at the base camp where conditions are poor. In addition, lactation rates themselves are sensitive 
to drought.  Given these factors, one would expect women to have greater incentive to insure when there 
are many lactating animals in the household herd.  That said, a woman’s control over lactating animals 
and associated income might increase her capacity to self-insure and lower her WTP for IBLI. Therefore, 
the relationship between wealth alone and IBLI uptake remains ambiguous. 
 Asset ownership can also increase a woman’s intra-household bargaining power, which is 
important in cases where the unitary model of household decision-making fails and household members 
do not have identical preferences (see Chiappori and Donni 2009 and Alderman et al. 1995 for 
discussions of the unitary model).  McPeak and Doss (2006) demonstrate contested decision-making 
processes in milk marketing decisions in northern Kenya, supporting the conclusion that preferences are 
likely different among household members. In the context of non-identical preferences among household 
members, one of the factors that shapes an individual’s bargaining position within a household is her 
defection point, or what she can expect to walk away with if bargaining fails and the household dissolves. 
The control a woman exerts over household assets such as livestock influences her defection point.  
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Women’s incentive to insure could be positively correlated with the size of her endowment, which would 
in turn be positively correlated with bargaining power, suggesting potential for a positive relationship 
between female assets and female IBLI purchase.  Given these factors, we might expect that female assets 
have a stronger positive effect on IBLI uptake by women than by men, but considering the ambiguity of 
the relationship between wealth and IBLI uptake discussed above, the overall effect is ambiguous.  
 
 In light of the four key elements of gender and microinsurance demand discussed above, the 
remainder of this analysis considers demand for IBLI for an individual i at time t, (𝑌𝑖𝑡) as 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑖 ,  𝑅𝑖 , 𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝐴𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑉𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       
 
where 𝐺𝑖 represents gender, 𝑅𝑖 represents an individual’s time-invariant risk aversion, 𝐼𝑖𝑡  represents 
informal insurance coverage,  𝐾𝑖𝑡 represents product education and 𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents female assets. 
Additionally, 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑉𝑖𝑡−1, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represent, respectively, price, current IBLI coverage and a host of 
demographic and insurance-related characteristics.  Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents a disturbance term.  Before 
specifying the model in depth, we turn to discussion of the setting, data and key variables. 
 
SETTING AND DATA 
 The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Cornell University, and the Oromia 
Insurance Company (OIC), in collaboration with local government Development Agents (DAs), and 
numerous researchers, introduced the IBLI product in the southernmost part of the Oromia Regional State 
of Ethiopia in August 2012, following the successful piloting of a similar product in neighboring northern 
Kenya in January 2010.  IBLI is marketed and sold by OIC, with technical support provided by ILRI.  
IBLI policies are sold twice a year during sales periods in August/September and January/February, 
which correspond to the ends of the dry seasons in the bimodal rainfall pattern in the arid-to-semi-arid 
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region. Contracts cover a one-year period and individuals choose the number of animals they insure.  
IBLI is priced by geographic region and species, according to drought risk.  Insurance premiums range 
from 7.5-11 percent of the estimated value of the animal. 
This analysis takes advantage of two sources of data.  The introduction of the IBLI product 
involved collection of annual household survey data and several experimental features, all of which were 
designed to aid in impact assessment and encourage IBLI uptake.  Informed by initial exploration of two 
rounds of survey data, I then designed a complementary qualitative data collection tool that was 
implemented in April 2014 with the express purpose of addressing gaps in the survey data and enhancing 
understanding of key concepts relating to IBLI uptake and gender.    
 
Survey and Implementation Data 
 The survey sample was selected prior to IBLI implementation to capture geographic, agro-
ecological and livelihood variation in the eight southernmost woredas of the Oromia Regional State where 
IBLI would be offered.  Using multi-stage cluster sampling, the household survey sample was clustered 
by reera, a subunit of the woreda, containing approximately 100-300 households. Reeras inaccessible by 
vehicle were excluded for logistical and cost reasons.2  For the selected reeras, local government 
development agents were deployed to compile household rosters containing the name of the household 
head and livestock holdings.3 Stratifying by livestock terciles, a proportional random sample of 15 percent 
of each reera was drawn with a minimum rule of 25 households per reera.  Where 15 percent of 
households in one reera did not meet the 25 household minimum, neighboring reeras were combined into 
a single sampling unit, making a total of 17 sampling units (ILRI 2014). 
                                                        
2 Note that reeras were not selected randomly and therefore cannot be said to be representative of the regional state, 
woredas or kebeles from which they were drawn.  Reera-level population data outside of the selected reeras is not 
available and therefore survey weights, if used, would apply only to the selected reeras and will not be statistically 
valid for conclusions outside of the sample.   
3 Households were defined as “a group of people who live in the same homestead (which may consist of more than a 
single dwelling) and share food and other items bought from a common household budget.”  In the context of 
polygamous marriages, one husband can have multiple wives and each wife may or may not have a separate 
household (ILRI 2014). 
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 The household survey is conducted annually in March, following the conclusion of the 
January/February IBLI sales period.  Baseline data were collected in 2012 with repeated data collection in 
2013 and 2014.  Though data are collected annually, many variables are collected using a monthly or 
seasonal recall structure.  This allows for analysis using two panel periods within each year that 
correspond to the twice-yearly IBLI sales period and bimodal rainfall pattern, as depicted in Figure 1.4 
Data are collected on a broad range of household characteristics and behaviors relating to livelihoods, 
livestock management, herd dynamics, wellbeing, risk management and demographic characteristics.  
Baseline data consist of 515 households.  After attrition and missing data, 464 households are retained for 
analysis.5  
 
 
 
 In order to encourage uptake of IBLI and aid in understanding the effects of liquidity constraints 
on insurance purchase, discount coupons were randomly distributed to 80 percent of households across all 
reeras.  Discounts ranged from 10-80 percent for purchase of up to 15 tropical livestock units (TLU) of 
                                                        
4 Rainfall data from Lasage et al. 2010. 
5 See Appendix A for further details on panel construction.  See Appendix B for complete attrition analysis.   
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livestock.6   The remaining 20 percent of household received no coupon, unless they were participants in 
ILRI’s annual herd migration survey, in which case they had a 50 percent chance of receiving a 100 
percent voucher for IBLI purchase up to 15 TLU.  Only ten households received the 100 percent voucher 
in any given sales period. 
 Two additional educational treatments were also randomly assigned to separate samples of 50 
percent of the survey households.  The first treatment was an audio recording of a skit about IBLI, 
developed by ILRI and OIC.  Local development agents were asked to play this tape to selected 
households.  The second treatment was an illustrated pamphlet describing IBLI.  Both the audio and 
visual treatments were distributed in the course of broader extension and marketing visits to communities.  
Using data obtained directly from ILRI as well as data from the household survey, Table 1 demonstrates 
how households were assigned to receive the encouragement treatments at least once between August 
2012 and January 2014 and either did not receive them or did not remember receiving them at the time of 
the survey.  This could be due to implementation failure and/or poor recall by respondents.  Assignment 
data, rather than household self-reported data, for these treatments are used in analysis and, given 
imperfect compliance, effects should be interpreted as intention-to-treat estimates. 
 
Table 1: Randomized Encouragement Treatments 
Treatment 
HHs assigned treatment 
(% of total) 
HHs reported receiving treatment (% 
of total) 
Discount coupon 
Skit tape 
Cartoon 
80% 
13% 
20% 
55% 
9% 
19% 
 
 The 2014 data collection had two features designed to contribute to this study.  First, marital 
status for all female-headed households was verified and, where the household head was a married 
female, additional information about the status of the husband was gathered.  This served to validate 
                                                        
6 TLU, or tropical livestock units, are calculated based on metabolic weight.  1 TLU = 1 bovine = 0.7 camel = 10 
sheep/goats. 
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previously collected marital status data.  Second, ILRI collected information on the endowment of 
livestock brought to the household by brides at marriage, as well as information on current stocks and 
recent flows of such animals.  
 
Qualitative Data 
 Following the logic of purposive sampling (Patton 2002), the qualitative sample is stratified along 
the key dimensions of IBLI purchase history and gender of household head.  To better understand 
heterogeneity within female-headed households, we stratify within this category by marital status. This 
created eight unique categories from which I intended to sample two households at specific points along 
the distribution of wealth, measured by the household’s herd size during the 2014 survey period. 
Appendix C contains details on the sampling strategy. Based on this sample, qualitative interview data 
were collected from 15 survey households7 in April 2014.  The interview guide was designed after 
preliminary analysis of the first two rounds of survey data in order to complement survey data in pursuit 
of testing the four conceptual hypotheses outlined above.8    
 The primary intended contribution of the qualitative data was to complement the survey data in 
the investigation of the above gender-related hypotheses. In particular, qualitative data provided an 
opportunity to examine the perceptions of risk associated with IBLI in order to better understand the role 
of risk aversion.  Interviews also examined the nature and extent of informal insurance coverage in 
Borana and perceptions of differences in coverage between men, women and people of different marital 
statuses.   Lastly, interviews elicited consumer preferences surrounding sources of information about IBLI 
and the stated reasons for these preferences.  With respect to these hypotheses, qualitative data also 
provided an opportunity to enhance description and contextual understanding, and bring new information 
about heterogeneity to categories and behaviors that appear homogeneous in the survey data.  Finally, the 
                                                        
7 Unforseen changes in marital status and purchase behavior resulted in only 15 out of the intended 16 households 
being interviewed. 
8 Complete interview guide is contained in Appendix C. 
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qualitative data validated survey data to improve the identification and understanding of measurement 
error in key variables, thus informing variable construction, econometric model specification and 
interpretation of econometric results. The most salient qualitative findings are reported in the following 
discussion of variable construction and, later, in the interpretation and discussion of econometric findings.   
 
KEY VARIABLES  
IBLI purchase and TLU insured 
 The ILRI survey contains a question asking if the respondent purchased insuraansii horrii, or 
livestock insurance, in the past year and the qualitative sample was selected based on reported purchase 
behavior.  However, we found significant error in these variables when implementing qualitative 
interviews, which led us to validate survey responses using OIC administrative data.  When compared 
against administrative data, only 87% of respondents correctly identified their recent purchase behavior. 
Of all misreported purchases, 80 percent were false positives while only 20 percent were false negatives, 
indicative of systematic over-reporting of IBLI purchase.  Households that had purchased IBLI at least 
once in previous years, but appeared to misunderstand the reference period of the question, accounted for 
a majority of false positives.  Other false positives may be households that failed to make the distinction 
between purchasing the IBLI product and being part of the survey sample.  A majority of households 
(73%) in our qualitative sample conflated the ILRI survey or visits by OIC and ILRI staff with the IBLI 
product at least once in the interview when asked about insuraansii horrii, suggesting that people 
understand the term in a variety of ways.  False negatives are likely due to the interviewee in the survey 
being different from the person who purchased and poor information sharing within the household, a 
pattern that could also contribute to false positives.  Given the non-random nature of the measurement 
error in reported IBLI purchase, and its centrality to this analysis, this analysis uses OIC administrative 
IBLI purchase data. 
 
Gender of IBLI purchaser 
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 The gender of the household head is the most practical proxy for gender of purchaser, given that 
it is highly correlated with the gender of the person named on the insurance contract with a bivariate 
correlation coefficient of 0.94.  Furthermore, in the limited cases where the head was not the purchaser, 
one can assume that the household head influences the purchase decision in some way and indeed, this 
dominates in the qualitative data on decision making where being the household head was cited as the 
reason the respondent had the most influence over a livestock or budget allocation decision in 67% of 
households. In this analysis, a female-headed household with a male individual named on the insurance 
contract is considered a female IBLI purchase and vice versa.  Neither of these cases is a common 
occurrence in the survey data where women in male-headed households made only 2.2 percent of total 
IBLI purchases and 1.3 percent of purchases were made by men in female-headed households.   
 
Risk aversion  
 The baseline household survey included a risk preference experiment in which the respondent 
chooses from a set of six gambles where risk and expected outcome are positively correlated (ILRI 2014).  
Using these data, I created a set of binary variables by combining the two lowest, middle and highest 
levels of risk aversion to represent low, moderate and high risk aversion.  
 
Informal insurance coverage 
 Finding a meaningful indicator of informal insurance coverage is challenging. Given prior 
studies’ use of informal cash and in-kind transfers between households and network group participation as 
measures of informal insurance coverage (Lybbert 2004, Jensen et al. 2014), qualitative data collection 
was tailored to explore the extent to which these institutions—groups and transfers—serve an informal 
insurance function in the Borana context.  It appears that network groups and transfers capture 
participation in institutions that may function as informal insurance, but not all groups and not all 
transfers are insurance. So it is complicated. 
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 Qualitative validation of survey data suggests that the network groups captured in the survey—
mostly savings and loan groups and small business groups—provide extremely limited idiosyncratic 
insurance coverage and may not be meaningful as a measure of informal insurance.  While all but one 
group allowed members to take out loans when facing a shock, the three respondents who had taken 
advantage of this option described the group contribution to the wellbeing of their household as “small” 
or “low” compared to other sources of assistance in difficult times.  Two respondents stated explicitly that 
the group had not helped them to date and the remaining six respondents were unwilling to say the group 
had no benefits but at the same time were unable to articulate benefits they experienced.9 
 Qualitative data suggest that the decision to give a transfer is driven by two factors.  The first, 
which was demonstrated in the data from 100 percent of qualitative respondents, is the normative belief 
that one is obligated to help those who are most in need, regardless of transfer history.  The second 
consideration is the giver’s recollection or expectation of reciprocity by the receiver, which was stated 
directly by 60 percent of qualitative respondents.  Qualitative validation of 58 specific transfers recorded 
in the survey data suggested that 46 percent of transfers may be insurance-related in that they provide one 
of several types of coverage in the form of ex ante investment in future incoming transfers from recipients 
(50%), ex ante preparation for the receiver in anticipation of a planned expense such as a birth or 
marriage (34%) and/or ex post coping for the receiver after an idiosyncratic shock (42%).  The ex ante 
insurance for giver function is often combined with the latter two functions, though this cannot be 
confirmed directly because data were only collected from either the giver or the receiver for a given 
transaction. Informal insurance is represented using the total of the absolute values of monthly cash and 
in-kind transfers received and given by the household in order to capture not only the insurance a 
household experiences in the form of a transfer receipt, but also the insurance a household experiences 
when they engage in ex ante insurance behaviors by giving to others with the expectation of reciprocity. 
 
                                                        
9 Four respondents had no household members participating in groups. 
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Product education 
 The survey captures the IBLI education experience of the household based on 14 specific 
questions about sources of information through which the household learned about IBLI.  Qualitative 
interviews probed the ways that people learned about IBLI and which information channels worked and 
didn’t work for them individually.  Again, this issue of whether people consider the difference between 
the IBLI product and participation in the IBLI survey sample comes into play.  When asked about 
learning about insuraansi horrii, nearly half (46%) of respondents focused initially on “learning” that the 
IBLI team was coming to do the survey (i.e., being informed to stay home and wait for the enumerator) or 
similar administrative information rather than increasing their understanding of how the IBLI product 
functions. During the interviews, we took care to clarify the focus of our interest, but it is unlikely that 
enumerators did so during survey data collection.  While all respondents—male and female—indicated 
that they prefer to be taught about IBLI in their homes for such reasons as convenience, reducing 
distractions and increased opportunity to ask questions, one might expect that this is more important for 
women whose domestic responsibilities, such as caring for children, cooking and looking after lactating 
and newborn animals, limit their mobility.  Additionally, only two women indicated that they attended 
community meetings where IBLI was discussed, and both opted to listen and let others ask questions.  
 One approach to measuring the product education experience of the household using existing data 
is the number of separate sources of information about IBLI that the household received.  The survey data 
do not capture the intensity of information or the type of information received through these sources, so 
this fails to disentangle IBLI product-focused information itself from information about the 
implementation of the survey or the presence of OIC sales agents in the community on a given day.  
Another approach is to incorporate survey data on the “most important source” of IBLI information, 
however qualitative data completely contradicted patterns in the survey data.10  Another approach is to 
                                                        
10 According to the survey data, the most important information sources for both male- and female-headed 
households were community meetings and NGOs, followed by the insurance company and informal conversations 
with friends and family.  Qualitative data contradict this.  All respondents who attended community meetings where 
IBLI was discussed reported not effectively learning about the IBLI product at community meetings.  No one 
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use only information sources that are explicitly product-focused such as radio, posters and OIC extension 
agents, but this fails to account for the unanimous sense that learning is more difficult in away-from-home 
settings.  One may learn less from a product-focused information session at a community meeting and 
more from an incidental conversation about IBLI with a health worker who visited the home to perform 
vaccinations. Coincidentally, home-centered and product focused information channels are nearly 
mutually exclusive, as laid out in Table 2. The intersection of these two categories consists of radio 
broadcasts—only 10 percent of the sample owns a radio—and the cartoon/tape intervention assigned to 
33 percent of households in the first sales period only.  Thus, in the variable construction decision there is 
a tradeoff between different types of measurement error associated with product-focused channels versus 
home-centered channels.  Home-centered channels may be biased upward from information “learned” 
related to implementation that is reported as IBLI product information, while product-focused channels 
may present information focused on the IBLI product directly, but without capturing the level of learning 
that took place. Given the importance of home-centered information to women, I opt to structure the 
variable as the proportion of total information sources that are home-centered.   
 
                                                        
reported community meetings as a preferred channel, though for many people they were the only product-focused 
channel, which may explain why this was chosen as “most important” in the survey data.  No one indicated that they 
learned about the IBLI product from informal conversations with friends and family.  The category “NGO” meant 
different things to different people, including ILRI, OIC or anyone who comes to the community in a car.   
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Table 2: IBLI Information Sources 
Product-focused channels Home-centered channels Neither 
Prevalence 
(%) 
OIC staff   11.8% 
Television   1.2% 
Posters   4.6% 
Cooperatives/Network Groups   3.7% 
Community meetings   49.2% 
Radio Radio  4.3% 
DAs (cartoon/tape) DAs (cartoon/tape)  37.1% 
 ILRI household survey  76.2% 
 NGOs  1.6% 
 Neighbors, friends and relatives  52.9% 
  Discount coupon distribution 50.1% 
    DAs (non-cartoon/tape) 64.8% 
 
 
Female assets 
 A good proxy for intra-household bargaining power in the context of IBLI will be correlated with 
a woman’s bargaining power, but not endogenous to her decision to purchase IBLI.  Commonly used 
proxies for bargaining power include women’s inherited assets, women’s current assets, women’s income 
shares, unearned income and assets, and human capital brought to marriage (Quisumbing & Maluccio 
2003, Hoddinott & Haddad 1995, Fafchamps et al. 2009, Schultz 1990, Thomas 1990).  Educational 
attainment at marriage is a logical human capital measure.  However given the limited educational 
attainment of the population of interest, I propose two different measures of female-controlled assets as 
proxies for bargaining power. 
 In the process of marriage in Boran culture, the bride and groom bring livestock gifted from their 
family members to the newly-formed household herd.  Cattle from the bride’s father are known as horrii 
siiqqee (HS).  HS animals and their offspring are given names that relate to their origin with the bride’s 
family.  Focus group discussions suggest that while everyone considers all animals to belong to the 
household, HS cattle are identifiable by all as part of the wife’s endowment and that there may be subtle 
restrictions on what can be done with these animals (e.g., selling, slaughtering, gifting) without the wife’s 
consent.  Importantly, the wife retains these cattle in the rare, but possible, event of a divorce.  As such, 
HS cattle provide an excellent indicator of a woman’s endowment.    
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  The use of assets at marriage as an instrument for the wife’s endowment comes with concerns of 
endogeneity.  Assets gifted by family members at marriage may be correlated with the degree to which a 
woman’s family invested in her physical and social wellbeing throughout her childhood. As such, a 
married woman’s decision to purchase IBLI may be influenced by her bargaining power, but also directly 
influenced by the unobserved ways her parents invested in her as a child. Quisumbing and Maluccio 
(2003) suggest that virtually all proxies for bargaining are vulnerable to endogeneity, but that a strength 
of using assets brought to marriage is that, unlike current asset holdings, it is unaffected by endogenous 
decision-making processes within the marriage.  
 An alternate measure of bargaining power using current assets controlled by the woman can be 
proxied by the number of lactating animals in the household herd. Milking and milk products fall into the 
female domain in Borana society and they represent the female contribution to the economy of the 
household (Coppock 1994, Hertkorn 2013).  As such, reduced lactation rates due to drought will affect 
women profoundly as lactation slows and, for some animals, lactation stops altogether, removing them 
from the female domain.  Lactating animals are expressed as a percentage of total herd. 
 Data on HS cattle were collected in March 2014.  Rather than attempting to elicit recall data for 
previous years, we collected information on HS cattle endowed at marriage, current stocks and births, 
deaths, transfers and sales over the previous year.  Using these data, we have generated HS animal stocks 
at seasonal periods beginning with March 2013 as well as stocks at the time of household formation.  
Both are expressed as a percentage of the household’s cattle herd. 
 
RESULTS 
Summary Statistics 
 As summarized in Table 3, panel households are 21 percent female-headed, a majority of whom 
are widows (70%).  Married female household heads comprise 20 percent of the female-headed 
households.  Married female-headed households tend to be polygamous households where multiple wives 
maintain separate households, or men may have been away herding at the time of the survey. In terms of 
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female headship, the sample is consistent with other estimates of the prevalence of female headship in 
Ethiopia which range from 9 percent of married households countrywide (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 
2002) to 29 percent of households in southern Ethiopia specifically (McPeak et al. 2011). Households 
were overwhelmingly Boran and practiced traditional forms of religion.  More than three quarters of 
households are fully settled and few households remain nomadic.  
  
  22 
 
Table 3:  Panel Household Characteristics 
    Frequency Percent 
Head Gender Female Head 97 20.9 
Male Head 367 79.1 
Total 464 100.0 
Marital Status of 
Female Heads 
Never married 2 2.1 
Married 19 19.6 
Divorced/separated 8 8.2 
Widowed 68 70.1 
Total 97 100.0 
Ethnic Group Borana 427 92.0 
Guji 36 7.8 
Gabra 1 0.2 
Total 464 100.0 
Religion Traditional 385 83.0 
Muslim 18 3.9 
Orthodox 1 0.2 
Protestant 42 9.1 
Catholic 7 1.5 
Other Christian 11 2.4 
Total 464 100.0 
Settlement Status Fully Settled 356 76.7 
Partially Settled 72 15.5 
Nomadic 36 7.8 
Total 464 100.0 
 
 Table 4 shows the overall means for the full sample as well as means for male and female-headed 
households and differences.  Detailed information on the construction of all variables is located in 
Appendix A.  Households in the sample herd, on average, 19 TLU of livestock. Total income is, on 
average, equivalent to $190 USD per household per month, only about $18 of which are cash earnings. 
Given the average household size of 7.3 individuals, this implies an average income of roughly $0.86 per 
day across the sample, 90 percent of which is in-kind, highlighting widespread poverty and the 
subsistence economy in the region.  Male-headed households have per-person income of $0.89 per day 
while female-headed households have a per-person income of $0.68.  Other statistically significant 
differences between male and female-headed households also emerge and suggest potential for 
differentiated IBLI demand by gender.  Female-headed households (FHHs) have, on average, smaller 
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herds, lower total income, participate in lower total transfers and fewer network groups.  Female-headed 
households’ reliance on livestock income is 14 percentage points lower than men.  Between male- and 
female-headed households there is no difference in highest educational attainment of any household 
member, but female households heads have significantly lower personal educational attainment than male 
household heads and also scored lower on a financial literacy test conducted at baseline.  There are no 
differences in risk aversion or expectations of upcoming rangeland conditions.  Female household heads 
are, on average, older than male household heads, probably due to the number of widows and longer 
female life expectancy.  FHHs are smaller by almost two people, yet there is no apparent difference in 
dependency ratios.  Members of FHHs also participate in fewer network groups.  These two features are 
likely due to male-headed households consistently containing at least two adults while most female-
headed households contain only one, consistent with significant differences in household size. With 
respect to IBLI, FHHs have fewer sources of IBLI information, yet this is not reflected in a lower score 
on a series of questions designed to test an individual’s knowledge of IBLI.  The rate of IBLI purchase 
does not differ by gender of household head, but FHHs who purchase IBLI tend to report having insured 
fewer TLU than male-headed households, though the percentage of herd insured is not significantly 
different between household types.  
 These means tests demonstrate multiple pathways in which demand could shift for women.  To 
the extent that income and wealth impact demand, one might expect lower demand for IBLI in female-
headed households due to smaller herd sizes and lower incomes, or, conversely, if income increases the 
capacity to self-insure, one might see higher demand among lower-income groups such as women.  
Gender differences in the proportion of income from livestock could also shift demand in either direction, 
depending on whether reliance on livestock income provides an incentive to insure or, given that it is 
largely in-kind, constrains liquidity with which to purchase insurance.  Gender differences in education 
and financial literacy have the potential to impact demand for a financial product such as IBLI, yet this 
would likely operate through their understanding of the product which appears to be similar.  If there is an 
age dimension to the adoption of new financial products, female-headed households, being older on 
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average, may exhibit differential demand. These possibilities will be further explored through regression 
analysis after examining the characteristics of IBLI purchasers and non-purchasers in greater detail.
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Table 4:  Panel Household Characteristics Disaggregated by Gender of Household Head (R3) 
   Aggregate   Male Head   Female Head   Differences  
   Mean   SD   Mean   SD   Mean   SD   Male-Fem   (t-stat)  
 Herd size (TLU)   18.43   25.87   20.63   27.61   10.00   15.08   10.6***  (5.22) 
 Total Income (ETB)   3,750.00   5,853.00   4,122.00   6,233.00   2,328.00   3,780.00   1794.2***  (3.68) 
 Cash Income (ETB)   357.40   3,397.00   361.70   3,677.00   340.80   2,009.00   20.9  (0.077) 
 Proportion of income from livestock   81.82   28.93   84.71   25.73   70.77   36.93   13.9***  (3.61) 
 Cash Savings (ETB)   1,493.00   9,791.00   1,709.00   10,802.00   669.40   3,986.00   1039.8  (1.55) 
 Asset Index   0.00   1.00   0.04   1.04   (0.15)  0.83   0.19  (1.91) 
 All Transfers   237.80   317.30   257.20   341.60   163.70   181.60   93.5***  (3.76) 
 Network Groups   0.96   0.93   1.05   0.95   0.62   0.77   0.42***  (4.74) 
 Education   3.29   3.13   3.32   3.16   3.16   3.04   0.16  (0.45) 
 Household Head Education   0.52   1.84   0.62   2.02   0.15   0.85   0.47***  (3.46) 
 Financial Literacy   4.16   1.27   4.26   1.19   3.78   1.50   0.48**  (2.98) 
 Age of Head   51.78   17.96   50.81   17.72   55.53   18.48   -4.72*  (-2.32) 
 Household Size   7.28   2.81   7.69   2.83   5.70   2.11   1.99***  (7.88) 
 Dependency ratio   1.39   0.87   1.35   0.74   1.54   1.24   -0.20  (-1.53) 
 Low risk aversion   0.39   0.49   0.39   0.49   0.41   0.49   -0.019  (-0.36) 
 Moderate risk aversion   0.43   0.50   0.43   0.50   0.45   0.50   -0.020  (-0.37) 
 High risk aversion   0.18   0.38   0.19   0.39   0.15   0.35   0.040  (0.99) 
 Expected rangeland below normal   0.46   0.50   0.45   0.50   0.49   0.50   -0.031  (-0.56) 
 Expected rangeland normal   0.30   0.46   0.30   0.46   0.30   0.46   -0.0040  (-0.079) 
 Expected rangeland above normal   0.24   0.43   0.25   0.43   0.21   0.41   0.035  (0.76) 
 Home-Centered Info Sources   37.22   20.00   37.59   19.67   35.81   21.26   1.78  (0.77) 
 IBLI Knowledge   4.91   1.80   4.96   1.82   4.73   1.72   0.23  (1.21) 
 Effective price per TLU   280.00   134.00   281.60   132.10   273.60   141.40   8.00  (0.52) 
 IBLI Purchase --Reported  0.30   0.46   0.30   0.46   0.30   0.46   -0.0015  (-0.029) 
 IBLI Purchase--OIC  0.08   0.27   0.08   0.27   0.08   0.27   -0.0015  (-0.051) 
 TLU Insured—Reported (n=149)   2.49   5.07   2.87   5.62  1.05   0.99   1.19  (1.79) 
 TLU Insured--OIC (n=38)  4.41   6.26   4.96   6.49   2.33   5.16 2.64  (1.06) 
 Percent herd insured--Reported  (n=149)  0.03   0.14   0.03   0.16   0.03   0.09   0.00006  (0.0021) 
 Percent herd insured--OIC  (n=38) 0.28   0.42   0.28   0.45   0.29   0.33  -0.0124  (-0.0072) 
 Observations  497 394 103 497 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001          
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 At the aggregate level, there are many differences between purchasers and non-purchasers (Table 
5).  Purchasers have larger herds, fewer non-livestock assets and a larger proportion of their income 
comes from livestock, consistent with the idea that dependence on livestock contributes to IBLI demand.  
Purchasers have greater financial literacy and IBLI-specific knowledge, highlighting the importance of 
the relationship between product understanding and uptake. Contrary to standard insurance demand 
theory, IBLI purchasers have lower risk aversion, suggesting that IBLI may not be perceived as risk-
reducing, yet at the same time purchasers are more likely to expect below-normal rangeland conditions.  
Purchasers had greater access to home-centered information sources than non-purchasers, but we see no 
differences in total information sources between these groups. 
 Among women, few differences emerge between purchasers and non-purchasers.  Purchasers 
continue to have fewer non-livestock assets, but aggregate differences in herd size and proportion of 
income from livestock do not hold for the female subsample.  Female purchasers do appear to give and 
receive less total transfers, suggesting potential for an inverse relationship between informal insurance 
and demand for IBLI.  IBLI knowledge remains important for women’s demand. 
 When comparing purchasers by gender, the differences presented in the final columns of Table 5 
largely mirror differences in the population as a whole presented in the final columns of Table 4.  
Notably, the absolute amount of TLU insured is significantly higher for men than for women, yet the 
proportion of herd insured is not significantly different.   
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Table 5: Differences Between Purchasers and Non-Purchasers, and Purchasers By Gender 
  Aggregate Female Purchasers by Gender 
  
Purch - 
Non t-statistic 
Purch - 
Non t-statistic 
Male-
Female t-statistic 
Herd size (TLU) 6.28** (2.85) -0.96 (-0.63) 18.8*** (6.43) 
Total Income (ETB) -351.3 (-1.48) 45.9 (0.14) 1174.7** (3.05) 
Cash Income (ETB) -52.8 (-0.80) -91.4 (-0.85) 69.5 (0.82) 
Proportion of income from livestock -7.66*** (-3.55) -0.0043 (-0.0009) 3.99 (0.78) 
Cash Savings (ETB) 3018.6 (1.89) 243.3 (0.39) 4515.7* (2.17) 
Asset Index -0.077** (-2.79) -0.091* (-2.28) 0.11*** (3.52) 
Total Value of Transfers 21.0 (0.27) -57.6* (-2.41) 173.6 (1.76) 
Network Groups 0.10 (1.90) -0.010 (-0.13) 0.53*** (5.77) 
Education 0.21 (1.09) 0.46 (1.05) -0.024 (-0.052) 
Household Head Education -0.15 (-1.44) 0.075 (0.58) 0.26 (1.57) 
Financial Literacy 0.17* (2.21) 0.17 (0.85) 0.51** (2.68) 
Age of Head -1.10 (-1.03) -4.86 (-1.94) -1.21 (-0.48) 
Household Size -0.26 (-1.68) -0.077 (-0.32) 1.69*** (6.36) 
Dependency ratio 0.0082 (0.14) 0.087 (0.47) -0.43* (-2.45) 
Low risk aversion 0.077* (2.51) 0.12 (1.78) -0.059 (-0.86) 
Moderate risk aversion -0.020 (-0.67) -0.082 (-1.25) 0.057 (0.85) 
High risk aversion -0.056** (-2.89) -0.037 (-0.89) 0.0019 (0.045) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.077* (2.50) 0.048 (0.71) 0.073 (1.06) 
Expected rangeland normal -0.035 (-1.33) -0.033 (-0.56) -0.012 (-0.20) 
Expected rangeland above normal -0.041 (-1.65) -0.015 (-0.26) -0.060 (-1.03) 
Total IBLI Info Sources 0.18 (1.86) 0.26 (1.49) 0.31 (1.68) 
Home-Centered Info Sources 2.57* (2.00) 1.34 (0.48) 1.30 (0.47) 
IBLI Knowledge 0.52*** (5.27) 0.74*** (3.63) 0.013 (0.062) 
Effective price per TLU -93.8*** (-11.2) -68.7*** (-4.55) -26.3 (-1.63) 
IBLI Purchase—Reported     0.0038 (0.068) 
TLU Insured—Reported     1.25*** (4.67) 
TLU Insured—OIC Records     2.39*** (5.91) 
Percent of herd insured--Reported     -0.27 (-0.93) 
Percent of herd insured--OIC Records     -0.27 (-0.90) 
Observations 1940   404   316   
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001       
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Econometric Strategy and Challenges 
 The econometric approach to estimating gender-differentiated demand for IBLI involves 
estimating determinants of an individual’s propensity to insure as well as the level of coverage purchased 
by that individual.  The binary purchase decision can be expressed as: 
 
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾1(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑖) +  𝛾2(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡) +  𝛾3(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑡) 
+ 𝛾4(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑖𝑡) +  𝛿0(𝐺𝑖) + 𝛿1(𝑅𝑖) + 𝛿2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐴𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝜂(𝑉𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝜑(𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  𝜁(𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
in which the purchase decision, 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡, is regressed on interactions of gender, 𝐺𝑖, with the variables 
of interest described in detail above as well as the first-order interacted variables and controls for price 
(𝑃𝑖𝑡), current coverage (𝑉𝑖𝑡−1), and household characteristics (𝑋𝑖𝑡). The acomposite error term consists, of 
𝜇𝑖, the unobserved individual effect, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡, the idiosyncratic error with zero mean, finite variance 𝜎𝜀
2 
and distributed i.i.d over all observations.  In this model 𝐺𝑖 = 1 represents a female-headed household.  
This allows us to understand the extent to which the average marginal effects (AME) of the variables of 
interest on the probability of IBLI purchase might vary by gender.  The level of coverage purchased, 
𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡  can be understood best by incorporating the predicted propensity to purchase from the purchase 
decision results in order to correct selection bias arising from the fact that values of 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡  are only 
observed when 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1.  Level of purchase is modeled as 
 
𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛾1(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑖 ) + 𝛾2(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡) +  𝛾3(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾4(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑖𝑡) 
+  𝛿0(𝐺𝑖) +  𝛿1(𝑅𝑖) + 𝛿2(𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿3(𝐾𝑖𝑡) +  𝜂(𝑉𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝜑(𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  𝜁(𝑋𝑖𝑡) 
+ 𝛽(𝜆𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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where 𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡  is regressed on interaction terms, first-order variables and the same set of controls as the first 
stage.  Following Heckman’s (1979) approach to correcting selection bias, we incorporate the inverse 
Mills ratio, 𝜆𝑖𝑡. 
 
𝜆𝑖𝑡 =
ϕ(𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑡)
Φ(𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑡)
 
 
When 𝜆𝑖𝑡 is calculated as a function of the same set of covariates in the first stage regression as is used in 
the second stage, selection is theoretically accounted for, but in practice the process is strengthened by the 
use of an exogenous instrument, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 , in the first stage that predicts selection, but has no relevance to the 
second stage dependent variable.  The first stage regression then becomes  
 
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾0(𝑍𝑖𝑡) +  𝛾1(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑖) + 𝛾2(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡) +  𝛾3(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑡) 
+ 𝛾4(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑖𝑡) +  𝛿0(𝐺𝑖) + 𝛿1(𝑅𝑖) + 𝛿2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐴𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝜂(𝑉𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝜑(𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  𝜁(𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where, in our case, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable representing the randomly assigned discount coupon, 
independent of the discount received which is incorporated into the regression as part of 𝑃𝑖𝑡. 11 With the 
discount considered separately, the coupon merely represents a piece of paper that reminds individuals of 
the existence of the IBLI product and the idea of purchase.  As such, the coupon is justifiably excluded 
from the second-stage regression under the assumption that once the individual has already made his or 
her purchase decision, the reminder effect of coupon itself is irrelevant. 
                                                        
11 The effective price of IBLI per TLU of coverage, accounts for discount coupons received in addition to spatial 
and temporal price variations.  However, IBLI is priced by species, not TLU.  Therefore, the price facing each 
individual depends on the animals they choose to insure.  For simplicity, I have calculated the effective TLU price as 
the price of insuring one cow rather than using the actual prices paid for the diverse combinations of animals 
individuals chose to insure.  Had I used the latter method, I would have difficulty defining a price for those who 
chose not to purchase IBLI. 
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 Recall that in both equations, the composite error term consists of 𝜇𝑖, the unobserved individual 
effect, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡, the idiosyncratic error.  The unobserved individual effect is likely to induce bias if a 
pooled estimator is used.  A fixed-effects estimator may be tempting, but the probit regression is then 
subject to the incidental parameters problem in estimations where the number of observations is large 
relative to the number of time periods, as is the case in these data.  A random effects estimator will be 
consistent if the individual effect is uncorrelated with covariates, an assumption that is unlikely to hold.  
Wooldridge (1995) proposes that, to the extent that the individual effect is associated with within-
household means of time-varying household characteristics, incorporating these means as controls can 
reduce the bias associated with a simple pooled estimator in the presence of fixed effects.  To do so, 
variables contained in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 that are potentially associated with the individual effect are used to generate a 
set of within-household means, ?̅?𝑖𝑡 , that are used as time-invariant controls.  These variables are also 
demeaned and re-incorporated as time-varying controls, ?̈?𝑖𝑡. After these variables are separated out, 
𝑋𝑖𝑡contains household head education, IBLI knowledge, financial literacy and dummy variables for each 
woreda in order to control for unobservables at the woreda level.  ?̅?𝑖𝑡 and  ?̈?𝑖𝑡 contain group means and 
demeaned values, respectively, of the household’s dependency ratio, expected rangeland conditions, 
previous period losses, age, age-squared, non-livestock assets, income, proportion of income from 
livestock, herd size and cash savings. The two-stage Heckman correction is then estimated using 
 
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾0(𝑍𝑖𝑡) +  𝛾1(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑖) + 𝛾2(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡) +  𝛾3(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑡) 
+ 𝛾4(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑖𝑡) +  𝛿0(𝐺𝑖) + 𝛿1(𝑅𝑖) + 𝛿2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐴𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝜂(𝑉𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝜑(𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝜁0(𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝜁1(?̅?𝑖𝑡) + 𝜁2(?̈?𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
and 
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𝑇𝐿𝑈𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛾1(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑖 ) + 𝛾2(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡) +  𝛾3(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾4(𝐺𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑖𝑡) 
+  𝛿0(𝐺𝑖) +  𝛿1(𝑅𝑖) + 𝛿2(𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿3(𝐾𝑖𝑡) +  𝜂(𝑉𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝜑(𝑃𝑖𝑡) 
+ 𝜁0(𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝜁1(?̅?𝑖𝑡) +  𝜁2(?̈?𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽(𝜆𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
to formally test the following hypotheses.   
 
1. The effect of risk aversion (𝑅𝑖) on IBLI uptake is invariant with respect to gender (𝐺𝑖). 
H0:   𝛾1=0  
HA:  𝛾1≠0 
 
2. The effect of informal insurance (𝐼𝑖𝑡) on IBLI uptake is invariant with respect to gender (𝐺𝑖). 
H0:   𝛾1=0  
HA:  𝛾1≠0 
 
3. The effect of product education (𝐾𝑖𝑡) on IBLI uptake is invariant with respect to gender (𝐺𝑖). 
H0:   𝛾1=0  
HA:  𝛾1≠0 
 
4. The effect of female assets (𝐴𝑖𝑡) on IBLI uptake is invariant with respect to gender (𝐺𝑖). 
H0:   𝛾4=0  
HA:  𝛾4≠0 
 
Econometric Challenges 
 Statistical identification of interaction terms included in the above models involves sufficient 
variation within gender subsamples.  Standard deviations reported in Table 4 suggest that, for the 
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interacted variables is indeed adequate.  Endogeneity of key variables is a concern in this estimation.  
Simulteneity between an individual’s knowledge or understanding of the IBLI product and their decision 
to purchase leave the knowledge variable correlated with the idiosyncratic error term over time. The most 
logical potential instruments for the knowledge variable are the randomly assigned cartoon and tape 
treatments described above but preliminary analysis found these two variables to be only weakly 
correlated with households’ understanding of the IBLI product.12 To the extent that households adjust 
informal insurance behaviors based on whether they have purchased IBLI or not, or their level of 
coverage, the informal insurance variable will also be correlated with the error term.  The lagged 
dependent variable, 𝑉𝑖𝑡−1, representing previous period IBLI purchase, or, put otherwise, whether an 
individual is covered in the current period, is likely correlated with household unobservable 
characteristics which impact the current purchase decision.  Given the lack of suitable instruments to 
address these endogenous variables, results should be interpreted with this likely endogeneity in mind.  
Other potentially endogenous variables include herd size and income, because income is primarily 
composed of herd-related income.  The extent to which these related variables are endogenous depends on 
the ways in which households adjust their herding practices in response to being insured and differences 
in effects of drought on herd size between those who purchased IBLI and those who did not.  To date, no 
Ethiopian households have received an IBLI indemnity payout and one might expect the credibility of the 
product and subsequent likelihood of detectable behavioral and herd size effects to develop substantially 
after a payout, but not before.
                                                        
12 First-stage regressions of IBLI knowledge on assigned cartoon and assigned tape yield F-statistics ranging from 
1.36-2.80, depending on the specification.  
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Econometric Results 
Purchase decision  
 Marginal effects from the first-stage probit regression of the IBLI purchase decision are presented 
in Table 6.13  I begin with a brief discussion overall demand patterns that appear consistently across all 
models.14  I then turn to the gender-specific results associated with the above hypotheses.  The 
relationship between IBLI uptake and price is statistically significant, but modest, with a decrease in 
probability of purchase of 0.1 percent for every 1 percent increase in price. Where included in the model, 
previous period purchase reduces the probability of purchase by 8 percent.  This result is sensible, given 
that the previous purchase period is 5-7 months prior to the current period and an IBLI insurance contract 
lasts 12 months.  Therefore, those who purchased in the previous period are currently covered and, 
assuming they understand the length of the coverage period, they would be less likely to purchase IBLI. 
Coupon assignment increases the probability of purchase by 5.5 percent, consistent with the assumptions 
that underpin its use as an instrument in the selection equation.  Households that expect lower-than-
normal rangeland conditions in the coming months are associated with a 6.4 percent increase in the 
probability of IBLI purchase.  Households with high livestock mortality in the previous period see a 
decrease in the probability of purchase of 4.5 percent.  In a society where livestock sales are a main 
source of liquidity, this points to liquidity constraints to access to IBLI.   
 Moving now to gender-specific results, column (1) represents a restricted regression that excludes 
any characteristics that vary visibly by gender in Table 4, as well as any characteristics that have the 
potential to vary systematically by gender.  The average marginal effect (AME) of female-headed 
household in this restricted regression is not statistically significantly different from zero.  This 
specification implicitly assumes that characteristics such as financial literacy, education or others that are 
excluded from this regression have no effect on the probability of IBLI purchase, so if there is any 
                                                        
13 Coefficient estimates can be found in Appendix D. 
14 These results are consistent across all specifications, including those using reported IBLI purchase rather than OIC 
record of purchase. Those results can be found in Appendix D. 
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correlation between such variables and gender and the exclusionary assumption is false, the coefficient 
estimate on the gender variable would be biased.  What this regression tells us is that when we include all 
of the various gender-related factors, whether mediated by other (currently omitted) characteristics or not, 
there is no variation in IBLI demand by gender. This is consistent with the proportionality of IBLI 
purchase by female-headed households to the number of female-headed households in the population. 
 Even if women’s overall demand for IBLI is not higher or lower than men’s, it is still possible 
that women’s demand is driven at least partially by a different set of factors.  Therefore, model (2) 
incorporates these characteristics that we would expect to vary by gender and to influence IBLI uptake, 
either by shifting slopes or intercepts for women.  We see that IBLI knowledge and financial literacy both 
have a positive effect on the probability of IBLI purchase, with a one-point increase in the scores on these 
respective tests corresponding to a 2.1 and 1.9 percent increase in the probability of IBLI purchase.  
While tests for statistically significant differences in means (Table 4) do not indicate differences in IBLI 
knowledge between male and female-headed households, they do suggest a difference in financial literacy 
at baseline, with women’s financial literacy lower on average than men’s.   This could translate into a 
systematically lower likelihood of IBLI purchase by women that is driven by baseline financial literacy, 
something we will explore in the next section.  Similarly, the percentage of income from livestock (scaled 
from 0-100) indicates that for every point increase in the share of income from livestock, the probability 
of purchasing IBLI decreases by a modest 0.2 percent.  The more livestock income one has, the less likely 
one is to purchase IBLI.  This contradicts the idea that those who are more dependent on livestock income 
are more vulnerable to drought and would have higher demand for IBLI. Most likely, this reflects the 
superior self-insurance capacity of those with the largest herds; they do not need insurance the way those 
with small or moderate herd sizes do.  Table 4 results indicate that, overall, female-headed households 
have a lower proportion of income from livestock, which suggests a greater likelihood of IBLI purchase 
by women than men.  We see no significant coefficient estimates on the interaction terms relating to 
product education, informal insurance and risk aversion and therefore fail to reject the null hypotheses 
that the average marginal effects are equal for men and women along these dimensions.  However, the 
  
 
35 
significant coefficient estimate on female-headed household suggests that there may be more to the story 
than is captured by our model.  Simply being a female-headed household is associated with a 14.5 percent 
increase in the probability of IBLI purchase, conditional on all observable factors that may differentially 
affect demand.  The optimistic explanation is that women’s sensitivity to risk is not fully captured by the 
risk aversion variable included in the model, leaving women’s perception of IBLI’s risk reduction 
potential captured in the coefficient on female-headed household.  A less optimistic, but perhaps more 
likely explanation is that, in a context where IBLI sales agents are paid on commission and all sales 
agents are men, women are more easily pressured to purchase. 
 Model (3) uses a sub-sample of two decision maker households to test for a bargaining effect 
associated with female assets at time of marriage.  We fail to reject the null that the average marginal 
effects of female asset holdings on IBLI uptake are equal for men and women.  These results are 
consistent across multiple representations of female assets, which can be found in Appendix D.  A 
modest, but statistically significant gender difference in the marginal effects of total cash and in-kind 
transfers on IBLI uptake of 0.05% is identified, suggesting that the relationship between informal 
insurance and IBLI may indeed differ between men and women.  Either women are covered differently 
than men in ways that are not captured by the transfers variable, or women respond differently to informal 
insurance coverage than men do.  The effect of transfers on men’s demand for IBLI is very modestly 
negative and not statistically significantly different from zero. For women, informal transfers appear to 
reduce demand for IBLI in a way that they do not for men.  
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Table 6: IBLI Purchase Decision (AME)    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female-headed household 0.010 0.145** 0.209 
 (0.020) (0.074) (0.161) 
Female Head X HS at marriage   0.096 
   (0.144) 
HS at marriage   0.039 
   (0.028) 
Female Head X Home info  -0.000 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Home-centered information  0.001 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Female Head X Transfers  -0.018 -0.051** 
  (0.013) (0.025) 
ln Transfers  -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion  -0.064 -0.093 
  (0.043) (0.081) 
Moderate risk aversion  0.008 0.008 
  (0.021) (0.021) 
Female Head X High risk aversion  -0.014 -0.382 
  (0.069) (0.309) 
High risk aversion  -0.023 -0.029 
IBLI knowledge  
(0.032) 
0.021*** 
(0.032) 
0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
Financial literacy  0.019*** 0.024*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Head Education  -0.006 -0.008 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.113*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
Lagged IBLI purchase  -0.080*** -0.065** 
Assigned coupon 0.066** 
(0.026) 
0.055** 
(0.028) 
0.046 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) 
Dependency ratio -0.026 -0.020 -0.058* 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.031) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.062** 0.064** 0.073** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) 
Previous period losses -0.039** -0.045** -0.048** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
ln Total monthly income  -0.011 -0.025** 
  (0.009) (0.011) 
Proportion of income from livestock  -0.002*** -0.001*** 
Household Average Characteristics 1 Y 
(0.000) 
Y 
(0.000) 
Y 
Household Average Characteristics 2 N Y Y 
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,510 
LR Chi2 362.3 630.2 574.2 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  The following coefficients are non-significant 
and not reported:  Household Average Characteristics 1includes household averages of dependency ratio, 
expected rangeland above normal, expected rangeland below normal and previous period losses.  Household 
Average Characteristics 2 includes household averages of age, age-squared, non-livestock assets, ln monthly 
income, proportion of income from livestock, ln herd size and savings >5 TLU.  Also not reported and non-
significant are demeaned ln herd size, expected rangeland above normal, age, age-squared, non-livestock assets, 
ln monthly income, proportion of income from livestock and savings > 5 TLU.  Full results can be found in 
Appendix D. 
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Level of purchase results 
 The second stage results presenting the effects of a range of factors on the level of IBLI coverage 
purchased are presented in Table 7.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithmic transformation of 
the number of TLU insured, therefore effects reported in the text have been back-transformed where 
necessary. Independent of gender, several general demand findings are worth mentioning.  IBLI price is 
inelastic, with estimated elasticities in the range of -0.36 to -0.47. This is consistent with price elasticities 
identified in a separate study of IBLI demand in neighboring Marsabit, Kenya (Jensen, Mude and Barrett 
2014).  Households that, on average, expected below normal rangeland conditions were negatively 
associated with IBLI uptake, suggesting that expectation of below normal conditions is associated with a 
33-39 percent decrease in TLU insured.  One possible interpretation is that this is the effect of household-
level pessimism that impacts IBLI uptake and is captured in the expected rangeland conditions variable.  
This explanation does not, however, fit with the positive coefficient on below normal expected rangeland 
conditions that we see in the purchase decision model.  For every one percent increase in household 
average herd size, we see a corresponding 0.2 percent increase in TLU insured, suggesting that, as herd 
size gets larger, households are prone to insuring a smaller portion of their herd.  As with the purchase 
decision model, there appears to be no gender variation in IBLI demand as indicated by the lack of 
significant coefficient on female-headed household in model (1).  This is consistent with the observation 
that, in the data, women’s IBLI purchase levels relative to herd size are proportional to men’s.   
 As with the purchase decision estimation, model (2) incorporates all variables that potentially 
shift slopes or intercepts by gender.  Unlike in the purchase decision model, here we do not see a 
significant marginal effect on female-headed household, suggesting that any effect related to sales agent 
pressure might be restricted to the decision to purchase and other factors drive the chosen level of 
purchase. A single point increase in the IBLI knowledge score is associated with a 3.8 percent increase in 
TLU insured.  Interestingly, the relationship between the education level of the household head and the 
level of IBLI purchase is negative, suggesting that each additional year of education is associated with a 
5.3 percent decrease in the TLU insured.  Assuming education and social status are correlated, this is 
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consistent with the idea that lower status may result in vulnerability to pressure by educated, commission-
motivated sales agents.  This may lead those with less education, such as women, to purchase higher TLU 
coverage than they otherwise would, were they positioned differently in society.  
 A change of one standard deviation in non-livestock assets is associated with a 16-19 percent 
decrease in TLU insured.  One might think that households holding diverse assets are less vulnerable to 
the threat of livestock mortality due to drought when such assets tend to be related to non-pastoralist 
livelihoods.  Yet at the same time one would not expect to see this effect operating through assets where 
estimates are conditioned on non-livestock income levels.  In this case, proportion of income from 
livestock is included as a control and is not statistically significant, therefore we consider this result with 
caution. 
 When gender is interacted with variables of interest in models (2) and (3), we fail to reject the 
hypotheses that there are no gender differences in the relationships between IBLI demand and home-
centered information sources, cash and in-kind transfers or female asset holdings. These results are 
consistent across multiple specifications of female asset holdings (see Appendix D).  We do, however, 
weakly reject the null that the average marginal effect of high risk aversion differs between men and 
women.  The effect of high risk aversion on males, represented by the coefficient on high risk aversion 
alone, is positive but not statistically significantly different from zero.  High risk aversion increases 
women’s purchase of IBLI by 41 percent compared to an equally risk averse man. Insurance demand 
theory suggests that as risk aversion increases, demand for insurance also increases. We only see such 
effects among women in this sample, and only weakly and in one specification. The effect disappears 
when we control for female assets brought into the marriage.  
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Table 7:  Level of Purchase 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female-headed household -0.085 0.218 -0.254 
 (0.068) (0.234) (0.572) 
Female Head X HS at marriage   0.325 
   (0.357) 
HS at marriage   -0.036 
   (0.072) 
Female Head X Home info  -0.003 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.007) 
Home-centered information  0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Female Head X Transfers  -0.020 0.003 
  (0.038) (0.073) 
ln Transfers  0.009 0.003 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion  
(0.019) 
-0.140 
(0.020) 
-0.312 
  (0.130) (0.238) 
Moderate risk aversion  -0.012 -0.029 
  (0.057) (0.058) 
Female Head X High risk aversion  0.346* -0.678 
  (0.206) (0.792) 
High risk aversion  0.037 0.037 
  (0.097) (0.103) 
IBLI knowledge  0.037* 0.041** 
  (0.019) (0.020) 
Financial literacy  -0.007 -0.004 
Head Education  
(0.023) 
-0.052*** 
(0.027) 
-0.057*** 
  (0.016) (0.017) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.473*** -0.358*** -0.356*** 
 (0.061) (0.040) (0.040) 
Lagged IBLI purchase  -0.044 -0.059 
  (0.078) (0.080) 
Dependency ratio 0.099 0.083 0.093 
 (0.082) (0.078) (0.101) 
Expected rangeland above normal 0.080 0.089 0.111 
 (0.104) (0.093) (0.103) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.129 0.009 0.017 
Asset index (0.101) 
(0.088) 
-0.147** 
(0.100) 
-0.173** 
  (0.074) (0.078) 
ln Total monthly income  -0.023 -0.016 
  (0.027) (0.032) 
Proportion of income from livestock  -0.000 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
ln Herd size  -0.086 -0.031 
  (0.097) (0.115) 
Savings > 5 TLU  -0.175 -0.165 
HA Expected rangeland below normal -0.328*** 
(0.118) 
-0.316*** 
(0.123) 
-0.284** 
 (0.117) (0.106) (0.118) 
HA Previous period losses 0.382*** 0.024 0.023 
 (0.074) (0.085) (0.092) 
HA ln Herd size  0.202*** 0.207*** 
  (0.064) (0.074) 
Constant 3.001*** 2.870*** 3.083*** 
Household Average Characteristics 1 
(0.166) 
Y 
(0.465) 
Y 
(0.523) 
Y 
Household Average Characteristics 2 N Y Y 
lambda 0.329 -0.00473 -0.0226 
 (0.210) (0.139) (0.142) 
Observations  1,824   1,824   1,510  
Chi2 362.3 630.2 574.2 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The following coefficients are non-significant and not reported: 
Household Average Characteristics 1 includes household averages of expected rangeland above normal and dependency ratio.  
Household Average Characteristics 2 includes household averages of age, age-squared, non-livestock assets, proportion of income 
from livestock and savings >5 TLU.  Also non-significant and not reported are demeaned age, age2 and previous period losses. 
  
 
40 
Discussion 
 Neither the IBLI purchase decision nor the level of IBLI purchase appear to demonstrate gender-
differentiated demand when tested using the restricted regressions discussed above.  Yet further analysis 
suggests that there are several pathways for gender-differentiated drivers of demand for IBLI, even if they 
do not amount to differences in demand outcomes. I first discuss gender differences in average marginal 
effects, and then discuss how differences in initial conditions shape demand for women in relation to men. 
 High risk aversion appears to have an appreciably different effect on IBLI demand for women 
than for men.  Future improvements that incorporate measures of risk aversion that are appropriate to the 
cultural context and decision-making domain could make a significant contribution to understanding what 
drives this gender difference.  Better understanding of gender and the perceived risks associated with 
IBLI specifically is also essential.  Qualitative respondents, who were mostly women, appeared to accept 
IBLI’s risk-reducing claims at face value, while simultaneously maintaining a wait-and-see attitude 
toward initial or further purchase.  Perceptions of IBLI as helpful were overwhelmingly positive (86%), 
despite no one having received an insurance payout. Some degree of response bias is likely, given that 
non-local IBLI staff were involved in qualitative data collection. As individuals learn about IBLI from 
experiences such as witnessing payouts or lack of payouts to themselves or their neighbors, understanding 
of the risks and benefits of the product will further develop.  Further data on these topics will be essential 
to understanding the relationship between risk-aversion and IBLI demand and will need to include careful 
consideration of whether the identity of those collecting information on perceptions of IBLI induces 
response bias. 
 Informal insurance has a negative effect on demand for women that is modestly different from the 
effect for men with equal informal insurance coverage, as we have measured it. The nature and extent of 
coverage by informal risk management underpins the perceived benefits of IBLI relative to other risk 
management approaches and using total transfers may not adequately capture gender differences informal 
insurance coverage.  The qualitative study’s respondents stated unanimously that access to basic levels of 
informal risk management in the form of mutual assistance and reciprocity is driven by need rather than 
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social connectedness or wealth.  Assuming that need is defined by the household’s material and labor 
resources, then it is captured in our model through herd size, income and dependency ratio controls. 
However, qualitative respondents described the extent of coverage provided by mutual assistance as a 
function of the “good behavior” of the individual, defined as pro-social behaviors encompassing all 
manners of helping others to the best of one’s ability given one’s material and labor resources.  Better 
understanding of the overall effect of informal insurance on IBLI uptake using data designed for such 
purposes will contribute to future understanding of any gender-differentiated effects. 
 I find no evidence of a gender-differentiated effect of home-based product information. This 
suggests that targeting marketing strategies to women via home-centered education may not provide a 
gender-differentiated benefit, and further consideration of the means of education that women prefer 
would be needed if improved targeting of women is a goal.  Considerable confusion among qualitative 
respondents regarding the definition of insuraansi horrii in the context of the product education module 
of the survey point to unusually high levels of random noise in this variable, which may limit statistical 
identification by attenuating any effect that may be present. 
 I also find no evidence of an intra-household bargaining effect associated with any of three 
specifications of female assets, including those based on horrii siiqqee, a particularly locally relevant 
variable.  This suggests that preferences among decision-makers are identical with respect to IBLI, and if 
this is true, implies that gender-based targeting in two-adult households is not relevant to increasing 
access to IBLI in this context.  Given the significant body of evidence that contradicts the presence of 
identical preferences among household members, these findings point to a need for further exploration of 
intra-household decision making in Borana.     
 Even where AMEs do not differ between women and men, gender differences in averages of key 
characteristics may also play a role in gender-differentiated IBLI demand patterns.  Means differences 
between male- and female-headed households’ financial literacy, education level and proportion of 
income from livestock are statistically significant, along with average marginal effects of these variables 
on IBLI demand.  This allows us to calculate the total effect of these differences in initial conditions of 
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financial literacy and proportion of income from livestock on the purchase decision and of household 
head education on the level of purchase.  As shown in Table 8, the total effect of one additional unit of 
financial literacy (in this case, a correct answer on a quiz) on the decision to purchase IBLI is quite 
modest at 0.009%.  On average, women depend less on livestock income and have smaller herd sizes than 
their male counterparts.  These two facts are consistent with the relative challenge single-adult households 
face of maintaining a pastoralist livelihood on the scale necessary to recover from shocks through self-
insurance strategies and the related trend toward town-based livelihood for female-headed households.  
However, the effect that these two factors have on IBLI uptake is ambiguous.  Female-headed 
households’ lower dependence on livestock income increases the probability of purchase by 2.8 percent, 
while their smaller herd sizes decrease their probability of purchase by 2.1 percent, reflecting the 
complicated relationship IBLI demand has with herd size, liquidity, and dependence on pastoralism. 
Women’s lower educational attainment, perhaps operating through previously discussed vulnerability to 
pressure by sales agents, increases TLU insured by 2.5 percent.  If pressure by sales agents is indeed 
behind this demand increase, it is unlikely to be sustained over the long term and we would expect to see 
a decline in women’s demand over time. 
 
Table 8:  Total Effects of Gender-Differentiated Initial Conditions on IBLI Uptake 
 
Mean Difference 
AME (%) Total Effect (%) 
(Female-Male) 
Financial literacy score -0.48 0.019 -0.009 
Proportion of income from livestock (%) -13.9 -0.2 2.8 
Herd size (TLU) -10.6 0.2 -2.1 
Head Education (years) -0.47 -5.3 2.5 
 
 These results suggest that addressing gender disparities in financial literacy would have a 
negligible effect on IBLI uptake by women.  Meanwhile, the relationship between a female-headed 
household’s reliance on the pastoralist livelihood appears to have a complex effect on IBLI uptake.  One 
can imagine a trajectory in which a female-headed household’s herd size decreases due to vulnerability to 
drought, while local towns increasingly offer alternatives to livestock income for single women.  Female-
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headed households with a lower average shares of income from livestock may recognize the potential 
offered by IBLI coverage to reduce the likelihood of shifting away from pastoralism completely in favor 
of town-based income sources.  Lastly, the negative effect of education on IBLI uptake, along with the 
strongly positive effect of being female, merits a closer look IBLI marketing and sales processes in order 
to understand whether the methods and strategies used encourage IBLI purchase induce a gender effect 
that inflates IBLI purchase based on social pressure rather than the product’s potential to reduce risk and 
limit the effects of catastrophic drought.  Employing sales strategies that encourage information-based 
choice to purchase IBLI will contribute to sustainable demand over the long term.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 Methodologically, this study provides an example of a structured strategy to combining 
qualitative and quantitative approaches in order to enhance insights into the phenomena of interest.  The 
role of qualitative data was identified based on initial exploration of survey data. Qualitative data 
collection procedures were developed with extra care taken to be explicit about the research process by 
first identifying the intended role of qualitative data, careful design of an empirically-grounded data 
collection tool and an empirically-grounded analysis strategy. Data collection procedures were 
standardized in order to facilitate replication of similar approaches. Qualitative data ultimately 
strengthened model specification and contextualized understanding of the range of possible 
interpretations of the econometric results.  
 This paper provides an initial perspective on dimensions of demand for index based livestock 
insurance that vary by gender.  Female-headed households purchase IBLI at the same rate as men, relative 
to their share of the population, yet the factors that drive women’s demand appear to diverge from men’s 
Econometrically, we reject the null that the AMEs of risk aversion and informal insurance are equal to 
zero for the level of purchase and purchase decision models, respectively.  Average marginal effects of 
high risk aversion and informal insurance coverage are positively and negatively associated with IBLI 
demand by women, respectively. These relationships are statistically significantly different between 
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women and men. We fail to reject the null that home-based product education and female assets have no 
gender-differentiated effects.  We find that women’s demand differs from men’s due to differences in 
initial financial literacy, herd size, income and education conditions.  A complex relationship between 
herd size, liquidity, dependence on livestock income and gender of household head is evident and demand 
effects are ambiguous.    The largest gender-differentiated demand effects relate to women’s lower social 
status and lower education status, which are positively associated with demand for IBLI, possibly through 
women’s vulnerability to pressure by sales agents. Gender differences in financial literacy affect demand 
only slightly.  
 In addition to aiding in econometric specification and interpretation, qualitative data suggest 
variables used to understand information sources and informal insurance may not capture these concepts 
precisely. Specifically, differences in informal insurance coverage and access may be driven by omitted 
variables reflecting pro-social behaviors and general confusion in terminology surrounding the IBLI 
product and the activities of ILRI researchers who implement IBLI generate considerable noise in 
variables relating to the marketing experience of the household, such as IBLI information sources.  A case 
is made for further investigation of the topic using data that captures unobservable effects that may 
underpin locally defined behavioral aspects of informal insurance access and gender differences in 
perceptions of IBLI’s risk reduction potential, as well as ongoing reduction of measurement error in key 
variables such as IBLI information sources. Future findings can be leveraged to develop tools and 
strategies for ensuring that access to and benefits from innovative financial products are equitably 
distributed across the population.   
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APPENDIX A:  Panel and Variable Construction 
 
 
 
Panel Structure 
 The Borana household data are collected annually, but the structure of the questionnaire involves 
seasonal recall for many variables of interest to this analysis.  Seasonal recall uses four seasons:  long 
rain, long dry, short rain and short dry, which I combine into long rain + long dry (LRLD) and short rain 
+ short dry (SRSD).  The IBLI purchase periods are in August/September and January/February, at the 
end of each SRSD and LRLD period.  The panel is analyzed by period, but data are collected by “round” 
as described in Table A1.  Variables that are not collected using the seasonal recall structure, require an 
assumption to be made based on the nature of the variable in order to determine the value at the 
intermediate period.  Any assumptions and other information about variable construction are described in 
detail below.   
 
Table A1:  Panel Structure 
Time Period Season Period (P) Round (R) 
March-Sept 2012 LRLD P1  
Oct 2011-Feb 2012 SRSD P2 R1 
March-Sept 2012 LRLD P3  
Oct-Feb 2013 SRSD P4 R2 
March-Sept 2013 LRLD P5  
Oct 2013-Feb 2014 SRSD P6 R3 
 
 
Gender of Household Head 
 The gender of the household head is virtually time invariant in the current data, with the 
exception of six observations where the gender of the household head changed.  For these I chose to use 
the within-household mode, which also happened to be the gender of the household head at the time that 
IBLI was introduced.  
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Marital Status 
 Marital status is collected using five categories:  Never married, married, consensual partner, 
divorced and widowed.  From the point of view of our analysis, consensual partnership (n=4) is 
functionally equivalent to marriage in that it creates a dual decision maker household, therefore I merged 
the consensual partner category with the married category.  This allows consensual partner households to 
be included in dual decision maker analyses.  Marital status for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed to be the same 
as P2, P4 and P6, respectively. 
 During data collection at P6, extra care was taken in collecting marital status data.  Households 
headed by widows often reported that they were married.  These errors were corrected in previous rounds 
by analyzing household member deaths.  For households where the husband died in a previous round, the 
wife’s marital status was adjusted to widowed after that point and married before.  For households where 
there was no record of the husband’s death, the death was assumed to have happened prior to survey 
implementation and therefore the wife’s marital status was adjusted to widowed for all survey periods.  
 
Herd Size 
 The size and species composition of animals herded by the household was collected at P2, P4 and 
P6, along with seasonal mortality, birth, offtake and slaughter information.  This information is used to 
calculate the P1, P3 and P5 values for these variables.  Herd information is then converted to Tropical 
Livestock Units (TLU) based on species metabolic weight to allow for aggregation across species.  
Borrowing from previous researchers in this area, 1 TLU = 1 bovine = 0.7 camel = 10 sheep/goats 
(McPeak et al. 2011, Lybbert et al. 2004, Jensen et al. 2014 and others).   
 
Total Income 
 Income is calculated as monthly average cash and in-kind income and includes labor market 
participation, milk production, livestock sales, livestock slaughters, aid and cash income from other 
sources.  Total income excludes informal cash and in-kind transfers.   
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 Daily average milk production per animal was valued using average market prices by species and 
season reported by households that sold milk.  Price data were too sparse to calculate prices by each of the 
four seasons, so two seasonal sets of prices—dry and rainy—were used.  This daily average milk value 
was then multiplied by 30.4 (average days per month) to get monthly average milk income.   
 Livestock that was sold and slaughtered was valued at median sale price by species and rainy/dry 
season.  Similar to milk prices, livestock sales data were too sparse across all 16 season/species 
combinations, I aggregated seasonal prices into dry and rainy season prices.  Given high variance in 
reported prices and the presence of extreme outliers, I opted to use median season/species prices.  I then 
estimated the animal sales revenue using transactions that were reported as sales, excluding gifts, loans 
and repayment of debts.  While these non-sale transactions most certainly have value to households, 
assigning monetary values to these cases is problematic.  Some of these activities are captured in the 
livestock transfers variable.  As it is, I think the estimated prices are a stretch given that animal age, 
quality, and sex are likely determinants of price that we are not capturing.  The alternative is to use prices 
as reported by households for livestock sales, but the problem of valuing slaughtered animals remains.  
The argument for using reported prices is that they may be more likely to correspond to the market value 
of the specific animals sold better than mean or median prices.   
 Income from aid was reported by respondents as average monthly values of supplementary 
feeding, food aid and other aid.  Respondents identified the number of months in the previous year that 
they received these three types of aid, which was then multiplied by the monthly value to get a yearly 
value of aid.  This yearly value was apportioned to the panel periods by the number of months in the 
period and that value was used to create an average monthly value for each panel period. 
 Cash income is calculated using respondent recall of income and income source by season (panel 
period).  Seasons are then divided by the number of months therein to obtain monthly average cash 
income for corresponding periods.  All income is included except that from sale of livestock, sale of milk 
and NGO work.  This income should be captured in milk, offtake and other assistance sections of the 
survey. 
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Cash Savings 
 Cash savings are reported by respondents in P2, P4 and P6, but there are no data on savings 
fluctuations between these periods, making it difficult to determine an appropriate value for P1 and P3.  
Currently, total savings data are only used descriptively and not in panel analysis.  In the panel analysis, I 
use a dummy variable to represent having enough savings to insure five cattle.  For P1, P3 and P5 I use 
the P2, P4 and P6 values of this dummy variable. 
 
Asset Index 
 The asset index is constructed using principal components analysis on 58 non-livestock durable 
goods.  Each item is listed in Table A2, along with the associated factor loadings for each survey round.  
Each variable is a count of the number of that item owned by household. Items for which there was zero 
ownership and/or zero variance, such as motorcycles and satellite dishes, were excluded. Complete stock 
of durable goods and housing amenities was taken at P2 and changes were collected at P4 and P6, 
allowing for calculation of P4 and P6 stocks.  Any recall error at P4 will carry over to P6.  For now, 
values for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed to be the same as P2, P4 and P6, respectively, though there is little 
basis for this assumption besides convenience. The assets section is one of the more tedious sections of 
the survey and is poorly tailored to the Borana context.  Both enumerators and respondents regularly 
expressed frustration with the assets module.  The stocks and flows nature of the data collection strategy 
creates potential for measurement error from previous periods to carry through to current periods and to 
accumulate over time.  
Table A2:  PCA Factor Loadings 
Asset P1/P2 P3/P4  P5/P6 
Animal Bell 0.303 0.609 0.233 
Animal Cart -0.135 . 0.217 
Anvil 0.080 0.215 . 
Axe 0.401 0.922 0.431 
Barbering Items 0.399 0.642 0.013 
Basin 0.400 0.855 0.207 
Beads 0.249 0.628 0.114 
Bedframe -0.001 . -0.021 
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Bicycle 0.192 . . 
Box or Trunk 0.380 0.673 0.199 
Brickmold 0.256 0.215 0.467 
Bucket 0.317 0.332 . 
Mobile Phone 0.436 0.603 0.061 
Chair 0.282 . 0.244 
Hammer 0.318 0.147 0.064 
Cup 0.006 0.944 0.570 
Dresser 0.220 . . 
Gourd 0.173 0.915 0.704 
Grinding Mill 0.208 0.370 0.227 
Traditional Healer Items -0.063 . 0.000 
Hides or Pelts 0.064 0.910 0.498 
Hoe 0.264 0.470 0.421 
Jerrycan 0.287 0.965 0.689 
Jewelry 0.107 0.303 0.104 
Knife 0.339 0.945 0.264 
Machete 0.257 0.540 0.143 
Mat 0.121 0.160 0.499 
Mattress 0.492 0.425 0.290 
Mosquito Net 0.328 0.824 0.075 
Motorcycle 0.153 . 0.060 
Natural Bed 0.120 0.808 0.590 
Oven 0.056 . . 
Pannier 0.392 0.376 0.471 
Paraffin Lamp 0.334 0.331 0.079 
Pickaxe 0.337 0.507 0.333 
Plow 0.209 0.593 0.173 
Chisel 0.367 0.640 0.513 
Radio 0.331 0.358 0.134 
Shelves 0.167 0.353 0.094 
Shop 0.192 . 0.019 
Sickle 0.466 0.481 0.251 
Sofa 0.120 . . 
Spade 0.428 0.589 0.344 
Spear or Club 0.307 0.553 0.381 
Stocks . . -0.009 
Stall -0.107 . . 
Stool 0.095 0.959 0.775 
Natural Stove 0.197 0.254 -0.032 
Kerosene Stove -0.073 . . 
Cooking Pot 0.243 0.969 0.684 
Table 0.050 . -0.016 
Television 0.077 . . 
Thermos 0.268 0.350 0.195 
Till 0.064 . . 
Wardrobe 0.208 . 0.099 
Watch 0.363 0.356 0.329 
Water Drum -0.130 0.263 . 
Wheelbarrow 0.150 . -0.038 
Where loading is missing, variable was dropped due to limited variance in that survey 
round. 
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Cash and In-kind Transfers Received and Given 
 Transfers data are reported by respondents using the seasonal recall structure, allowing for 
calculation of season-specific values for all periods, which are then divided by the number of months in 
the period to create monthly averages for transfers received and transfers given.  In regressions, transfers 
are represented as the total of the absolute values of transfers in both directions. 
 
Education 
 Education is education level of the household head, in years.  Through grade 12, each grade 
corresponds to one year.  Beyond that, education levels were re-scaled to correspond to the number of 
years of education associated with each level of attainment.  Education data are collected in full at P2, and 
then only information on household members who enter and leave school are collected in later periods.  
To calculate the attainment of an individual, one must make an assumption about whether individuals in 
school advance to the next grade.  I assume that all individuals advance every year they are in school.   
Educational attainment of the household head for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed to be the same as P2, P4 and 
P6, respectively 
 
Financial Literacy 
 Financial literacy is the number of correct answers to the seven questions listed below.  Financial 
literacy data were collected only at baseline and is treated as a time-invariant characteristic.     
 If you have 6 female goats and 3 male goats, how many goats do you have in total? 
 If you have 4 cattle subherds with each subherd with 5 animals, how many animals do you have 
in total? 
 If you have 400 goats and subdivide then into 10 equal subherds, how many goats are in each 
subherd? 
 I will read the following digits. Please listen to me, memorize it, and tell me the number: 369219? 
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 Suppose you want to borrow some money, and you have to pay back Birr 10 for every Birr 100 
that you borrow. This is called interest rate. Are you familiar with this concept? 
 Suppose you borrow Birr 100 , and you have to pay back Birr 10 every month for every Birr 100 
that you borrow. If you have not repaid any of the total for a period of three months, how much 
do you owe at the end of the 3 months? 
 Suppose you need to borrow Birr 500. Two people offer you a loan. One requires you to pay back 
Birr 600 in a month. The second requires you to pay back Birr 500 plus Birr 15 for every Birr 
100 you borrow that month. Which loan represents a better deal for you? 
 
Dependency Ratio 
 The dependency ratio is calculated as the number of dependents divided by the number of adults.  
Children are defined as those aged 15 and under, while adults are defined as those older than 15.  I 
omitted elderly dependents due to suspected age inflation in the right tail.  Including elderly dependents 
created households without adults.  Ages for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed to be equal to P2, P4 and P6, 
respectively.  
 
Household Size  
 Household size is a simple count of the number of members listed in the household roster.  We do 
not have data on household size fluctuation between survey rounds and I assume that household sizes at 
P1, P3 and P5 are equal to P2, P4 and P6, respectively. 
 
Risk Aversion 
 Risk aversion is measured at baseline using a coin toss gamble where risk and return are 
positively correlated.  The respondent is presented with the following introduction: 
 
  
 
55 
Let me introduce you to a lottery, whose value depends on the outcome of a coin.  I am going to 
flip a coin.  In each lottery, if the coin lands on head, you will win the amount below the picture of 
the head.  If the coin lands on a tail, you will win the amount below the picture of tail of this coin….I 
now offer a chance for you to choose one of the six lotteries displayed in the next image, which may 
allow you to earn from 0 to 200 ETB, depending on your choice of lottery and your luck.  The total 
amount of reward you will get will depend on the outcome of the lottery you choose, which will 
depend on the outcome of the coin that I’m going to flip. (ILRI 2014) 
  
The respondent is then shown a series of six images of head and tail sides of an Ethiopian coin and 
associated amounts of money and is asked to choose.  The six gambles are displayed in Table A3.  Using 
these data, I created a set of binary variables by combining the two highest, middle and lowest choice 
numbers to represent low, moderate and high risk aversion, respectively. 
 
Table A3:  Risk Preference Experiment Choices 
Choice Number Heads Amount (ETB) Tails Amount (ETB) 
0 50 50 
1 45 95 
2 40 120 
3 30 150 
4 10 190 
5 0 200 
  
 
IBLI Information Sources 
 Information was collected at P4 on whether individuals heard about IBLI through specific 
information sources.  These sources are:  neighbors, friends and relatives in informal groups; development 
agents or other government officials; community meetings; the survey conducted by ILRI; discount 
coupons; cartoons; poet tapes; radio; television; posters; Oromia Insurance Company staff and/or Oromia 
Savings and Credit Share Company; NGO staff; network groups; other.  Given confusion about this 
question that was noticed during the qualitative phase of research, this variable was structured the 
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percentage of total information sources that were home-centered, that is, information sources that 
potentially educate about IBLI that are accessible from home.  This percentage is expressed as whole 
numbers between 0 and 100 to aid in interpretation.  The number of information sources at P3 and P5 are 
assumed to be the same as at P4 and P6.  
 
IBLI Knowledge 
 The IBLI knowledge variable is constructed using a count of correct answers to the following 
eight questions: 
 Based on your understanding of the livestock insurance, how often do you have to pay a premium 
in order to remain insured? 
 If you did not receive indemnity payout (compensation) from the livestock insurance, would you 
expect to receive your premium back? 
 When you receive an indemnity payment (compensation) in what form do you expect to receive it 
in? 
 Based on your understanding of the livestock insurance, under what conditions do you expect 
indemnity payout (compensation)? 
 Suppose that you had insured 10,000 Birr of cows. What is the maximum indemnity payment that 
you can receive after a worse drought? 
 What institution will provide you indemnity payout in October 2013 if there is a payout? 
 Boru insured 10 cattle by IBLI. There was no drought but Boru lost 8 cattle due to disease 
outbreak. Will Boru receive indemnity payout? 
 Godana has decided to purchase IBLI for 1 cattle, 1 camel and 1 shoat among his herds. Will 
Godana pay different amount of premium for all the three species of animals? 
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These questions are asked only at P4 and P6, so values for P3 and P5 are assumed equal to P4 and P6 
values. 
 
Lactating Herd 
 The number and species of lactating animals is collected as part of the survey.  However, the 
survey doesn’t capture herd dynamics (birth, death, offtake, slaughter) by animal sex, so I cannot compute 
lactating animals for P1, P3 and P5 directly.  Therefore these values are assumed to be the same as P2, P4 
and P6 respectively.  Lactating animals are aggregated using TLU in order to at least partially capture the 
differences in milk production volume between species.  However, TLU conversions are not designed 
specifically for lactating animals, which may have profoundly different metabolic processes.  
 
Horrii Siiqqee Animals 
 Horrii siiqqee (HS) animals are cattle that are transferred to a newly married couple from the 
bride’s household.  Current HS stocks were collected at P6, along with information on birth, death, 
offtake and slaughter of HS animals in the preceding year.  Flows information was used to back out HS 
values for P4 and P5.  Additionally, HS stocks at the time of marriage were collected for all ever-married 
households.  All HS values are converted to percentage of total cattle herd.   
 
Effective Price 
 The effective price of IBLI is designed to capture as accurately as possible the actual price faced 
by the individual consumer.  The price of IBLI varies by species, geographic location (woreda) and 
discount coupon amount.  Coupons offer a percentage discount on IBLI purchase up to the first 15 TLU 
of livestock purchased.  However, IBLI is priced by species and not by TLU and effective price must be 
in price per TLU in order to allow for aggregated analysis across species. One approach is to use the 
actual prices paid by those who purchased IBLI on various combinations of animal species, but I would 
still have to transform those prices into a price per TLU and would still have no straightforward way of 
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defining a price for non-purchasers.  I chose to calculate the effective TLU price as the price per animal 
for the first 15 cattle using the woreda-level IBLI cattle prices minus any discount coupon received by the 
household. Woreda-level IBLI prices remain relatively constant throughout the survey periods, while 
coupons are distributed in advance of each sales period.  This allows for calculation of effective price for 
all panel periods.  
 
Share of Income from Livestock 
 The share of income from livestock is defined as income from milk, offtake and slaughter divided 
by total income and is calculated for all panel periods.  It is expressed as a number from 0-100 to aid in 
interpretation of results. 
 
Losses in Previous Period 
 Previous period losses are the lagged values of livestock mortality as reported by respondents.  
Because this information is reported seasonally, no assumptions were needed to complete the panel.  
 
Expected Rangeland Conditions 
 Respondents are asked about their expectation for the coming (long) rainy season and rangeland 
condition.  Their responses are scaled so that 1=much below normal, 3=normal and 5=much above 
normal.  I then created a set of dummy variables representing above normal, normal and below normal, 
with normal as the omitted category in regressions.  Expected conditions for P1, P3 and P5 are assumed 
equal to P2, P4 and P6. 
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APPENDIX B:  Attrition Analysis 
 
 Ten percent of the original survey sample attritted over the three survey rounds.  I used two 
approaches to testing for systematic attrition—simple means tests on key observables and a logistic 
regression using a binary variable representing whether a household was retained in the panel or lost to 
attrition.  Means tests using the main sample used for purchase decision regressions suggest that multiple 
variables are different between panel and non-panel households, as reported in column (1) of Table 1B.  
However, means differences disappear when multivariate methods are used. So in column (2) I report the 
logit estimates of the binary variable that the household attritted.  The logit model demonstrates that 
attrition is not systematic once we condition on key variables. Similar to the main sample, univariate 
means tests, reported in column (3) show significant differences.  The logit of attrition within the 
bargaining subsample of two decision maker households, reported in column (4), shows gender and 
wealth related attrition patterns, which are not surprising given that households with two married adults 
have different dependency ratios and productive capacity than single-adult households.  Marital status is 
also a significant predictor of attrition, which makes sense since being married and having two decision 
makers in the household are highly correlated.  Overall, attrition does not appear to be of concern to the 
main estimation results, and bargaining results need to be interpreted with attrition patterns in mind. 
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Table 1B:  Attrition Analysis     
  Main Sample Bargaining Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female-headed household 0.152 -0.00520 0.660*** -0.0488 
 (1.97) (0.00607) (15.52) (0.0522) 
Married=1/Nonmarried=0 0.022 -0.00935 -0.635*** 0.432*** 
 (0.39) (0.0102) (-14.49) (0.118) 
Moderate risk aversion -0.005 -0.00361 -0.019 -0.0557* 
 (-0.06) (0.00401) (-0.37) (0.0327) 
High risk aversion -0.054 0.0180 -0.008 0.0369 
 (-1.25) (0.0136) (-0.23) (0.0602) 
ln Total Transfers -2.420*** 0.00525 -1.215*** 0.0988*** 
 (-5.89) (0.00530) (-6.74) (0.0273) 
Financial literacy -0.272 0.000430 -0.622*** 0.0308** 
 (-1.26) (0.000921) (-4.25) (0.0138) 
Head Education -0.062 0.00143 -0.346* 0.0191 
 (-0.21) (0.00208) (-2.27) (0.0171) 
Dependency ratio 0.101 0.000914 0.453*** 0.00516 
 (0.53) (0.00130) (3.63) (0.0147) 
Expected rangeland above normal -0.009 0.00349 0.058 0.0511 
 (-0.18) (0.00513) (1.65) (0.0602) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.027 0.00370 -0.041 0.0539 
 (0.41) (0.00458) (-0.90) (0.0414) 
Age of household head -4.898 0.000004 2.350 0.000782 
 (-1.68) 0.0000574 (1.21) (0.000915) 
Asset Index -0.100 0.000385 -0.525*** 0.00979 
 (-0.75) (0.00119) (-5.75) (0.0188) 
ln Income -0.971*** -0.000181 -0.755*** -0.00405 
 (-6.16) (0.00194) (-8.92) (0.0363) 
ln Herd Size -0.822*** -0.00504 -0.871*** -0.0820** 
 (-4.16) (0.00554) (-8.62) (0.0341) 
ln Savings -0.362 0.000217 -0.963*** 0.00770 
 (-0.91) (0.000421) (-3.89) (0.00594) 
Observations 514 512 514 512 
T-statistics and standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
  
 
61 
APPENDIX C:  Description of Qualitative Study 
 
Introduction 
 Mixed methodological and interdisciplinary approaches have been common in many 
disciplines, including development economics, since the 1980s.  The 2001 “Q-squared” workshop 
and associated compilation of works (Kanbur 2002) highlighted the use of multiple research 
methodologies as a corollary to the broader interest in interdisciplinary social science research.  
Within development economics, qualitative methodologies are increasingly used to tackle 
questions of identification of the poor and causal explanations of poverty (see Shaffer 2013 for 
review).  Qualitative approaches have contributed to these analyses in a variety of ways, such as 
determining locally meaningful definitions and weights for dimensions of poverty, which are then 
incorporated into formal modeling, as well as enriching understanding of the overall causal 
framework underlying poverty dynamics.15 Few, if any, mixed methods studies in development 
economics explicitly describe the qualitative methods used to the extent that is demanded in 
quantitative studies.  Quantitative methodological procedures are made explicit, but qualitative 
are not, which undermines the credibility of inferences drawn using qualitative data (see Constas 
1992).  
 Methodologically, this study aims to take the Q-squared work a step further by making 
explicit the purposes of qualitative approaches for the questions of interest and the procedures 
used.  The credibility of any empirical finding hinges upon adherence to standards of validity and 
reliability in data collection tools, and the nature of the inference one intends to make from data is 
associated with a necessary level of rigor in these areas (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002).  
With this in mind, this study applies lessons learned from Q-squared in order to understand the 
determinants of demand for Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) that vary by gender in the 
Borana Zone of southern Ethiopia.  Within this, some sub-questions lend themselves easily to 
                                                        
15 See Krishna’s (2009) Stages of Progress methodology, Parker and Kozel (2007), Sharp (2007), Adato et 
al. (2007) for examples.   
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quantitative approaches, while others benefit from a complementary qualitative approach. 
Questions focused on the magnitude and direction of relationships, and the relative influence of 
variables on IBLI purchase behaviors are well served by quantitative approaches. Questions 
focused on individual perceptions, reasoning processes, and context-dependent explanations 
associated with the decision to purchase IBLI are well served by qualitative approaches.  From a 
modeling perspective, qualitative methods can improve modeling precision by exploring the 
structure of measurement error in existing quantitative data and identify omitted variables.  Key 
quantitative research questions and their qualitative extensions (italics) include:   
 
1. What is the relationship between gender and the IBLI purchase decision? 
a. How and why does household decision-making differ by gender and marital 
status of household head? 
2. Does the relationship between risk aversion and demand for IBLI vary by gender? If so, 
how? 
a. What are men and women’s perceptions of risks associated with IBLI purchase? 
3. What is the relationship between informal insurance and demand for IBLI? 
a. What insurance strategies, if any, are represented by informal transfers and 
network group participation? 
b. Outside of transfers and network group participation, what forms does informal 
insurance take in Borana? 
4. Does the relationship between informal insurance and IBLI vary between men and 
women? 
a. Do women experience informal insurance differently than men in terms of access 
and coverage? 
b. Among women, how and why do/don’t informal insurance experiences and 
coverage differ? 
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5. What is the relationship between IBLI information channels and IBLI uptake by gender? 
a. What are women and men’s preferred marketing channels and what reasons are 
given for such preferences?  
 
 For each of these five sets of questions, qualitative approaches bring more detailed 
descriptive content to existing quantitative data, which extends our understanding in three 
specific ways.   The first of these, is aiding in model specification.  Qualitative data will provide 
an opportunity to validate assumptions made during construction of key variables in the 
econometric model so that they more accurately reflect determinants of IBLI demand.  This is 
particularly relevant given the unique and rapidly changing cultural and economic practices of 
southern Ethiopian pastoralists in the 21st century.  Second, qualitative data may reveal 
heterogeneity within categories that appear homogeneous in quantitative data.  Difficult-to-
capture drivers of behavior such as social status may vary dramatically among the seemingly 
homogeneous categories such as “women,” or “men,” and qualitative exploration of these 
categories may explain contradictory or inconclusive findings.  Finally, insights gained from 
qualitative data will be used to strengthen the interpretation of econometric findings in order to 
explain outliers, inconsistent findings and provide descriptive support.  The ways which each of 
these purposes supports deeper understanding of the above research questions are described in 
detail in the following section.   
 
Gender and the IBLI purchase decision 
 This line of inquiry is designed to investigate intra-household decision-making related to 
IBLI purchase.  The quantitative strategy uses household level data with the gender of the 
household head as a proxy for the gender of IBLI purchaser.  This approach may limit 
understanding of intra-household dynamics that affect the decision to purchase IBLI.  The 
quantitative strategy accounts for some degree of bargaining in two-adult households, but is 
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unable to shed light on decision-making in single-adult households.  Single adult households in 
the sample are all female-headed, but autonomy and social status will affect the decision-making 
power of these individuals and likely varies by marital status (McPeak et al. 2011).  Qualitative 
interviews will focus on who in the household initiated decision-making related to IBLI, the 
involvement and influence of different household members, and how this decision-making 
process compares to other household decisions.  These data will be used to unpack heterogeneity 
of decision-making processes, with particular emphasis on single-adult households.  Qualitative 
data on two-adult households will aid in the interpretation of bargaining-related quantitative 
findings.   
 
Risk aversion, gender and IBLI demand 
 Perceptions of the IBLI product are clearly linked to the decision to purchase.  Theory 
suggests that a risk averse individual will have a higher willingness-to-pay for insurance, 
however, the relationship between risk aversion and index-based insurance products does not 
convincingly follow this pattern (Giné et al. 2008, Cole et al. 2012).  If purchasing the insurance 
product is perceived as risky in itself, then the individual’s ambiguity aversion becomes an 
important factor if he or she prefers the known risk of, say, drought to the relatively unknown risk 
of drought insurance.  Ambiguity aversion has been cited as a reason for poor uptake of index-
based products and has been incorporated into some studies of demand (Clarke and Dercon 2009, 
Clarke 2011). Elabed et al. (2013) link ambiguity aversion to compound risk aversion in an 
experimental setting involving index insurance decisions, finding that compound risk aversion 
may play a role in limited demand for index insurance products.  The quantitative strategy for 
understanding risk aversion and IBLI demand does not allow for ambiguity aversion as a 
determinant of demand.  Those who are risk-averse but opt not to purchase IBLI may be doing so 
because they perceive IBLI purchase to be an unknown risk relative to drought.  In a review of 
four field studies of index insurance marketing, Patt et al. (2009) identify three sources of 
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perceived risk by consumers as (a) lack of trust in the implementers of the insurance product, (b) 
lack of trust in the index and (c) lack of trust in one’s own understanding of the product and 
associated ability to make the best decision.  Qualitative interviews will focus on trust in these 
aspects of IBLI and, using Patt’s framework, the data will allow for better understanding of the 
potential role of ambiguity aversion.  Of particular interest is whether there is a difference in trust 
in the IBLI product between men and women, which will contribute to interpretation of 
econometric results relating to risk aversion.   
 
Informal insurance and IBLI demand 
 The relationship between informal insurance strategies and formal insurance products is 
key to understanding demand for IBLI.  The quantitative strategy for understanding this 
relationship uses data on cash and in-kind transfers and network group membership to represent 
access to and coverage by informal insurance.  Limitations of the use of observed transfers or 
network groups are multifold.  First, transfers and network groups are institutions that have the 
potential to provide insurance, but the extent to which they do so is unknown and therefore these 
may be poor measures of informal insurance.  Second, they do not represent the complete set of 
transfers or network activities available to the respondent; they represent only those the 
respondent chose to activate in the reporting period.  Finally, informal insurance behaviors are 
driven by unobserved characteristics that are likely to simultaneously influence IBLI demand. 
These challenges are very difficult to overcome analytically using qualitative or quantitative 
methods alone.  Mixed methods using the best techniques from each side may be especially 
useful.  Interviews will attempt to understand the extent to which reported transfers and groups 
represent insurance by eliciting detailed information on the circumstances surrounding actual 
transfers received and given as well as network group participation reported in the household 
survey.  Of particular interest are the circumstances and expectations surrounding the transfer 
and, for transfers given, the consequences of not agreeing to give the transfer.  For transfers 
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received, I will attempt to elicit information on hypothetical alternative sources of transfers and/or 
recourse available to the recipient had the giver refused to give.  Qualitative data will serve to 
validate existing survey data by uncovering heterogeneity in the functions of transfers and group 
membership. This may inform the specification or interpretation of the econometric model.  
Qualitative data will also provide description of other informal insurance strategies outside of 
transfers and network groups that may not have been captured in the survey data. 
 
Informal insurance, gender and IBLI demand 
 Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that there exist notable differences in access 
to and coverage by informal insurance along dimensions of wealth and social-connectedness 
(Santos and Barrett 2011, Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett 2009).  Gender differences in wealth 
and social-connectedness are visible in existing IBLI household data from the study region, 
suggesting the existence of gender differences in informal insurance access and coverage.  Within 
female-headed households, one sees variation in wealth and social connectedness by marital 
status, suggesting further heterogeneity within the female informal insurance experience.  
Interviews will focus on perceptions and perceived drivers of relative access to and coverage by 
informal insurance by gender and marital status.  Qualitative data will aid in understanding 
heterogeneity among female-headed households and support interpretation of findings related to 
the interaction of gender and informal insurance on IBLI demand. 
 
Gender and IBLI information channels 
 Index insurance products are often unfamiliar to their targeted consumers and, given the 
low levels of education in Borana, education about the product is a major component of product 
marketing.  Gender sensitivity in marketing and education is relevant where gender roles 
potentially result in different access to information channels and intensities.  The extent to which 
this is the case in the study population is unknown.  Quantitative data used for understanding how 
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information channels interact with gender are limited to the nature of marketing channels, but do 
not capture the intensity of exposure to information from each channel or the individual’s relative 
difficulty or ease of accessing each channel.  Interviews will reference reported sources of 
information about IBLI and elicit individual’s experiences and preferences relating information 
channels. These data will contribute to basic understanding of information channel preferences by 
gender, as well as elicit richer description of households’ information experience in terms of 
access and intensity.  Information channel preferences will provide the basis for econometric 
specification of the information channel variable used in testing gender differences. 
 
 
Qualitative Methodological Procedures 
Sampling 
 The qualitative sample will be a sub-sample of the survey households.  I propose to 
sample for heterogeneity along pertinent characteristics of the full household survey sample as 
diagrammed in Figure 1 below.  Heterogeneous sampling generates detailed descriptions of 
unique categories as well as crosscutting patterns that derive their significance from having 
emerged out of heterogeneity (Patton 2002). Categories of interest in this study are IBLI 
purchase, gender of household head and marital status.  IBLI purchase and gender of household 
head are the top characteristics of interest, therefore the full survey sample is divided into 
subgroups of those who purchased and those who did not and further subdivided by the gender of 
the household head.   Adding marital status as a third sampling dimension allows us to better 
understand commonalities and differences among women based on the rationale that female-
headed households may differ markedly depending on whether the female head is married, 
widowed or divorced. There is no variation in marital status of male-headed households, as men 
appear to remarry quickly after losing a spouse.  Finally, given that wealth is associated, both 
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empirically and in the survey data, with gender, informal insurance and marital status, I consider 
wealth when selecting my sample. 
 The sampling scheme is depicted in Figure 1C.  Distributions are stylized representations 
of relative distributions from the R2 data.16  I sample eight individuals at the median wealth level 
in each cell, as illustrated by the solid stars.17 As a measure of wealth, I used the household’s herd 
size because of the centrality of livestock to Boran livelihoods.  Given its importance, extra care 
and diligence is taken by enumerators when collecting herd size data and therefore they are 
hopefully measured with less error.  Because wealth is a likely driver of many phenomena of 
interest in this study and wealth levels are significantly different in existing survey data between 
male and female household heads of different marital statuses, I have chosen to interview six 
additional women with wealth levels that correspond to the median wealth of the male 
interviewee of the same purchase category, as depicted by the blue lines and six transparent stars. 
Comparison of responses between men and women of the same wealth level may be suggestive of 
the extent to which wealth is a driver of the phenomena of interest. 
 Time and resources necessarily limit the sample size.  The choice to oversample women 
is justified by existing evidence in the survey data that there is notable heterogeneity in female-
headed households within the study population.  Better understanding how this heterogeneity 
influences insurance access by women is a necessary step toward understanding whether IBLI is a 
gender-neutral intervention.  Although generalization is obviously not possible with such a 
limited sample size, the qualitative findings derived from this study will provide an inductively 
grounded set of propositions that can direct future analysis in the present study and help 
formulate questions for future studies. 
 
                                                        
16 The number of individuals (n) in each cell of Figure 1C was determined using the R2 survey data.  In 
Figure 2C, n has been updated using R3 survey data. 
17 Median-based sampling is chosen due to the positively skewed nature of wealth distributions and outliers 
in the right tails.   
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 The sampling scheme was confounded by measurement error in the IBLI purchase and 
marital status variables.  After attempting to correct for and replace households with mis-
measured key characteristics, the structure of the sample changed from what is depicted in Figure 
1C to that depicted in Figure 2C.  Additional time for interviews also allowed for two extra males 
to be sampled that had been excluded previously due to anticipated time constraints.   
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Interview Procedure 
 The final interview guide is included below. There are several key features of the 
interview guide.  First, a standardized set of probes inspired by Patton (2002) was developed for 
eliciting complete responses.  Four types of probes were intended encourage the elaboration, 
clarification, justification and illustration of responses.  These probes were intended to be used 
consistently throughout the interview to minimize bias induced by spontaneous phrasing of 
probes, however these efforts were thwarted by challenges involving interpretation in the actual 
implementation and standardized probes were rarely used.  Other questions were designed to be 
initially open-ended, with pre-defined prompts associated with key concepts from previous 
empirical work.  Prompts were used as needed when open-ended questions and probes failed to 
touch upon key topics.  In order to connect the quantitative and qualitative data in a way that 
allows for meaningful inference, some interview questions were structured around quantitative 
data points for the household in question.  For example, I used respondents’ R3 data on transfers 
given, transfers received and network group participation to structure the informal insurance 
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section of the interview around discussions of specific transfers and groups the household was 
involved in.  Discussions of information channels drew on data reported by the household on the 
sources of IBLI information that they reported in R3.  This guide was refined in the field through 
pre-testing (out-of-sample) prior to the interviews. 
 Interviews were conducted over three weeks following collection of the R3 household 
survey data. Interviews were held in or near the respondents’ homes, with the exception of three 
interviews that were held in a neighboring village due to inaccessibility of the respondents’ home 
villages.  Interviews were conducted using an experienced interpreter who underwent three days 
of training specific to the interview guide.  Training included discussion of key terms and their 
interpretations in Oromiffaa, careful translation of questions, probes and prompts, and field-
testing of interview guide.  Oral consent was obtained using the IRB-approved consent script 
included below.  The interview took between 2 and 4 hours and the respondents were 
compensated with ETB 100 for their time.  
   
Analysis procedure 
 Transcription and analysis of interview data took place in the weeks following the 
interviews. Analysis took both deductive and inductive forms based on previous empirical 
findings, theory, and observed limits of theory.  A pre-determined analytical framework for each 
theme (noted in the second column of tables in interview guide) was developed based on previous 
empirical findings.  Where there was little or no previous work around which to structure a 
framework, a more inductive strategy was taken with the objective of exploring the range of 
responses.   
 Deductive analysis began with a coding process associated with each pre-determined 
analytical bins. I also residual responses that did not conform to the analytical bins in a more 
inductive manner.  The second stage of analysis was to involve comparisons of response 
dominance between men and women (Sections A-E of interview guide), purchasers and non-
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purchasers (Section B), lower and higher wealth households (Sections C and D) and among 
women of different marital statuses (Section D).  Dominant responses are defined using a 
frequency threshold or those with low frequency but a direct relationship to theory or previous 
empirical findings. I define “strong dominance” as a response frequency of over 66% in any 
given category, weak dominance as less than 33% in a given category and moderate dominance 
as the interval in between.  Some weak responses were meaningful and worthy of analytical 
attention, despite their infrequency, due to their alignment with theory and/or previous empirical 
findings.   
 Inductive analysis involved looking for response dominance and relational patterns 
within responses where there was weak or no empirical precedent for analysis and/or where 
individual experiences diverge from the analytical bins.  Divergences and commonalities across 
responses were recorded, as well as comparisons between key groups discussed above.  
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Oral Consent Script 
 
Thank you very much for your decision to participate in our study.  The goal of this study is to 
understand how men and women view and manage risk.  You are one of 16 individuals who were 
randomly selected to participate from the household survey participants. We intend to learn 
about risks that households currently face and about the different ways individuals deal with 
these problems. The household survey has given us some information about these topics, but we 
are interested to know more details so that we can better understand how women’s and men’s 
experiences are different.   
 We will ask your opinions on different ways of managing the risks you face, especially 
those relating to livestock.  We will also ask you your opinions about IBLI and the way you 
decided whether to purchase IBLI.  The interview will take approximately 2 hours.  You will 
receive ETB 100 as a token of appreciation for taking time to participate in this interview today.  
 You may ask questions now or anytime during the interview. This interview will be 
recorded and transcribed and we will keep the recordings and transcripts in a locked place.  All 
the information you give will be strictly confidential. Your name will not be associated with any 
of your responses or given to anyone outside our project. If you would rather not answer any 
questions, just say so. You may opt out of this interview at any time you wish. Your cooperation is 
greatly appreciated, as it will help us to understand the life, problems and attitude of pastoralists 
in this area.   
 May we proceed with the interview? 
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Final Interview Guide  
 
Sections A-E of the interview guide correspond to planned interview themes.  The first column 
contains questions and associated prompts, while the second column is blank and can be used for 
translation notes.  
In addition to the questions listed below, I’ve developed a standard set of probes to be used 
individually as needed throughout the interview.   
Elaboration:  
 I am beginning to understand.  Can you say some more about X? 
 When did X happen? 
 Who was involved in X? 
 Where were you at that time?   
 Where did X happen? 
 How were you involved in X? 
 How did X come about? 
Clarification: 
 I want to make sure I understand what you’re saying.  Can you tell me what you mean by 
X? 
Illustration: 
 Can you tell me about a time when X happened? 
 Can you give me an example of X? 
Justification: 
 Why do you believe X? 
 
Section A: Household Decision-Making 
I’d like to talk about your decision to purchase or 
not purchase IBLI in the previous two sales period 
(previous year)? 
 
 
1. Can you describe how the idea to [purchase or 
not purchase] IBLI first began? 
a. [Prompt] Who in your household first 
brought up the idea of IBLI?    
b. [Prompt] When did the idea first come up? 
c. [Prompt] What made [person] bring up the 
idea? 
Inductive 
 
Head / Spouse / Grown Child 
 
When IBLI was introduced / Well after 
introduced  
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d. [Prompt] Did you discuss within your 
household? 
 
Discussed / Didn’t discuss 
2. Were you involved in the decision to 
[purchase/not purchase] IBLI?   
Yes/No 
a. If yes, can you describe your involvement? 
i. [Prompt] Were you consulted by other 
household members? 
ii. [Prompt] Did you give your opinion 
without being asked? 
iii. [Prompt] Did you make the final 
decision? 
iv. [Prompt if purchased] Did you physically 
go purchase IBLI? 
Involvement in different stages of 
decision-making:18 Problem recognition 
/ Pre-purchase information search 
(passive/active?) / Evaluation of 
alternatives / Decision to execute 
purchase / Post-purchase evaluation of 
relationship btw product expectations 
and performance. 
b. If no, what do you think the reason is that 
you were not involved? 
i. Does being a [woman/man] have 
anything to do with why you weren’t 
involved?  If so, can you tell me about 
this? 
 
By chance (e.g., was unavailable at time 
of decision) / Traditional role19 / 
Uninterested / Other reason? 
3. Of adults or grown children in household, who 
[else] was not involved in the decision? 
a. What is your relation to this person/people? 
i. [Prompts] Member of household?  
Gender of person?  Parent, child, other 
relation? 
Household members:  Male/Female, 
Adult/Child 
b. Why was this person [people] not involved 
in the decision? 
i. [Prompt] Can you think of any specific 
reason why they weren’t involved? 
Status / Traditional role / Other20 
                                                        
18 Decision-making is conceptualized using these five stages as per Mitchell et al. (1994).   
19 The traditional role conceptualization is described by Davis (1976) as an arrangement where decision-
making power resides in the position one occupies in the household rather than what he calls a comparative 
resources conceptualization in which power is assigned based on the characteristics of the individual 
household member (e.g., competence, ability to punish, etc).  The traditional role framework is consistent 
with FGD responses from the Borana zone which describe gendered spheres of responsibility associated 
with the household division of labor. 
20 Drawing from Coppock’s (1994) and McPeak et al’s (2011) ethnographic descriptions of the study 
population, suggest that age and gender are closely associated with status within Boran society.  These 
authors also describe gender-specific spheres of household production.  More recent focus group 
discussions suggest that men and women have separate, but sometimes overlapping decision-making 
spheres wherein women tend to manage the household budget while men tend to make livestock 
management decisions.  
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ii. [Prompt] Does being a [woman/man] 
have anything to do with why they 
weren’t involved? 
4. Of all those involved in the decision, who had 
the most influence?   
a. What is your relation to this person? 
i. [Prompts] Member of household?  
Gender of person?  Parent, child, other 
relation? 
Household members:  Male/Female, 
Adult/Child 
 
b. Why did this person have the most 
influence over the decision to purchase 
IBLI? 
i. [Prompt] Does this person have more 
influence on most household decisions 
than you do? 
ii. [Prompt] Does this person usually have 
the most influence on decisions about 
livestock? 
iii. [Prompt] Does this person usually have 
the most influence on decisions about 
what money is spent on? 
iv. [Prompt] Are there any other reasons why 
this person had the most influence over 
the decision to purchase IBLI? 
Status (age, gender, other status-related 
reason) / Sphere of decision-making is 
associated with that person (livestock 
management, household management, 
budgetary, other) / Other 
5. Of adults and grown children in the household, 
who had the least influence?   
a. What is your relation to this person? 
i. [Prompts] Member of household?  
Gender of person?  Parent, child, other 
relation? 
Household members:  Male/Female, 
Adult/Child 
b. Can you tell me why this person had the 
least influence? 
i.  [Prompt] Does this person have less 
influence on most household decisions 
than you do? 
ii. [Prompt] Does this person usually have 
little influence on decisions about 
livestock? 
iii. [Prompt] Does this person usually have 
little influence on decisions about what 
money is spent on? 
Status / Sphere of decision-making is 
not associated with that person / Other 
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iv. [Prompt] Are there any other reasons 
why this person had the least influence? 
6. From the beginning when the idea of IBLI was 
first introduced by [person described above] to 
the discussion of whether to purchase to the 
actual purchasing [if purchased], how did the 
process of deciding to purchase IBLI compare 
to other household decisions such as decisions 
about the household budget or livestock 
management decisions?   
a. [Prompt] Was your involvement and 
influence similar? 
b. [Prompt] Were the other people involved 
the same as those involved in most other 
decisions? 
c. [Prompt] Was the most influential person in 
the IBLI decision the same as in most other 
decisions? 
d. [Prompt] Was the least influential person 
the same as in most other decisions? 
Involvement in different stages: 
Problem recognition / Pre-purchase 
information search (passive/active?) / 
Evaluation of alternatives / Decision to 
execute purchase / Post-purchase 
evaluation of relationship btw product 
expectations and performance. 21 
 
 
Section B: Perceptions of IBLI 
I would like to know how easy or difficult is it for you to believe that IBLI will pay you when 
there is a drought.  
7. Has there been a time when you experienced 
drought but IBLI didn’t pay you or other people 
in the community who purchased?  
a. [Prompt]  Can you give me an example 
of how drought for you is different than 
for IBLI? 
Yes/No 
 
IBLI drought definition is more severe / 
IBLI drought definition is less severe / 
No differences 
8. Sometimes NGOs or other people come with 
new ideas of how to help, but you don’t really 
understand how their idea works so you’re not 
sure it will be helpful. 
 
a. Do you feel you understand enough about 
IBLI to make a confident decision about 
purchase?  
i. [Prompt] Can you tell me more about 
this? 
Yes/No 
 
Inductive 
                                                        
21 See footnote 4 (Mitchell et al. 1994). 
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9. Sometimes NGOs or other people come with 
ideas of how to help, but then they don’t do 
what they said they would do and you don’t get 
the help you were expecting. 
 
a. Can you tell me about any time you’ve felt 
disappointed in the people bringing 
insurance to you?   
i. [Prompt] Have you felt this way about 
any of the IBLI people? 
ii. [Prompt] Have you felt this way about 
the DAs or the cooperatives who sold 
you insurance? (if applicable) 
iii. [Prompt] Have you felt this way about 
any other IBLI-related people or 
organizations? 
Yes (associated with OIC, ILRI team 
members, cooperatives, other 
implementing partners) / No 
 
Inductive 
b. Do you worry that something like this 
could happen with IBLI [again] in the 
future?  
Yes/No 
i. If so, what makes you worry about this?  Inductive 
ii. If not, what makes you feel confident 
in IBLI? 
Inductive 
10. Can you describe any other reasons why you 
think that purchasing IBLI might not be a good 
idea for you?   
Inductive 
11. Taken together, do the risks you’ve just 
described [in questions 7-10] feel greater than 
the risk of drought?  
a.  [Prompt] Which risk would you rather 
take—drought or IBLI? 
 
Yes/No 
12. Which of the concerns about IBLI that we have 
discussed is the biggest for you? [Referring to 
their responses to 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
Trust in implementer / Trust in their 
own understanding / Trust in index / 
Other 
a. Why is this the biggest concern for you? Inductive 
 
 
Section C:  Information Channels 
I would like to hear from you about the ways that 
you learned about IBLI.  I see that you reported 
hearing about IBLI through [list all sources reported 
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in R3], and that [most important source] was the 
most important source of IBLI information for you. 
13. Of the [information sources reported], how 
many times did you engage with each one in the 
past year? 
 
Frequency 
14. Of the [information sources reported], which 
ones taught you the most about IBLI? 
 
a. What made these the most informative?  Inductive 
15. In your opinion, is it easy or difficult for you to 
access this channel of information?   
Perceived as easy / Perceived as 
difficult 
 
*One can prefer a channel but not have 
access to it.  
 
b.  What makes it [easy/difficult] to access 
this channel of information? 
i. [Prompt if difficult] what would 
make it easier for you to access this 
channel of information? 
Inductive 
16. Were you able to get all of the information you 
wanted through this channel or do you still wish 
you could get more information? 
  
Got all info / Wants more info 
c. If didn’t get all information, what kept 
you from getting all of the information 
you wanted?    
Inductive 
17. Are there ways of learning about IBLI that 
really do not work for you? 
Inductive 
d. What makes these information channels 
unhelpful for  you? 
Inductive 
18. What ideas do you have for ways that they 
could teach you about IBLI that would work 
well for you specifically? 
Inductive 
e. Why would these ways work well for 
you?   
Increase access / Increase intensity / 
Other 
 
 
Section D:  Transfers  
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22 This typology is derived from McPeak’s (2006) analysis of livestock transfers specifically.  Here I apply 
his typology to cash, in-kind and livestock transfers.  Non-insurance purposes include redistribution, rituals, 
breeding, herd-composition adjustment 
I want to ask you about some of the transfers you reported in the household survey.  First I will 
ask about transfers you received from others, and then I will ask about transfers you gave to 
others.   
 
 
[Transfers Received—These questions will be asked about the two most recent cash or in-
kind transfers received by the respondent.  ] 
 
19. I see that you received a transfer of [what] from 
[whom] in [season].  Can you tell me about the 
circumstances of this transfer? 
[If the transfer is for the purpose of ceremony, do 
not ask a, b, c, or d.] 
Inductive 
Ex ante prep for shock / ex post 
response to shock / non-insurance 
purpose22 
a. Did you ask for this transfer?   Yes / No 
i. If so, why did you ask for this transfer? 
ii. If not, why did you receive this transfer? 
Ex ante prep for shock / ex post 
response to shock / non-insurance 
purpose 
b. What did you ask for exactly?   
i. [Prompt] Was it something specific?   
Inductive 
ii. Were you given something different from 
what you asked for? 
Different / Same 
Inductive 
c. Can you tell me what you thought about as 
you decided to ask this person for the 
transfer?  
i. [Prompt] Did you think about ways that 
you had helped them in the past? 
ii. [Prompt] Did you think about ways that 
you may help them in the future? 
Inductive 
 
Direct reciprocity 
d. Did you worry that the person would refuse 
to give you what you asked for?   
Yes / No 
i. If so, what in particular made you worry 
that the person might refuse? 
Inductive 
ii. If no worrying, why not? 
1. [Probe if didn’t worry that person 
might refuse]  Can you tell me more 
about why you didn’t expect this 
person to refuse? 
Didn’t expect them to refuse / Didn’t 
desperately need transfer from that 
person / Other reason 
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23 Clarke and Dercon (2009) suggest that one of the key features separating insurance from safety nets is 
the existence of an explicit and enforceable contract or agreement.  Exchanges where there are few or no 
explicit consequences if one individual reneges are less representative of an insurance mechanism.   
e. Do you think the person who gave you 
this transfer could be expecting 
something from you in return?   
Yes / No 
i. What are the person’s expectations in the 
future? 
1. Did you talk about the expectations 
or is it like the proverb, “The hands 
wash each other turn by turn.” 
2. [Prompt] The proverb 
says….[proverb], so does that mean 
they expect you to give them the 
exact same thing in the future? 
3. [Prompt] Or do they expect you to 
give them something equivalent in 
the future?   
4. [Prompt] Apart from what we have 
discussed above, is there something 
else you think the person expects 
from you?  
Explicit agreement / No explicit 
agreement 
 
Expectations associated with specific 
transfer / Expectations associated with 
relationship to person / Expectations 
associated with something else 
ii. What would you have done if the person 
had refused to give you the transfer when 
you asked? 
Recourse23 / No recourse 
iii. Who else might you have asked for a 
transfer if this person had refused? 
Number of potential transfer links that 
could be activated. 
 
[Transfers Given—These questions will be asked about the two most recent cash or in-kind 
transfers given by the respondent.  ] 
  
20. I see that you gave a transfer of [what] to 
[whom] in [season].  Can you tell me about the 
circumstances of this transfer? 
Inductive 
Ex ante insurance for giver / ex ante 
prep for receiver shock / ex post 
response to shock / non-insurance 
purpose 
a. Did they ask you for this transfer?   Yes / No 
i. If so, what was the reason that they 
gave? 
ii. If not, why did you decide to give them 
this transfer? 
Ex ante prep for shock / ex post 
response to shock / non-insurance 
purpose 
b. What exactly did they ask for?   Inductive 
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24 See previous footnote (Clarke and Dercon 2009). 
25 Santos and Barrett (2011) suggest this is a driver of livestock transfers among members of the study 
population. 
iv. [Prompt] Was it something specific?   
c. Did you decide to give them something 
different from what they asked for?   
i. If so, why? 
Inductive 
f. Are you expecting something in return from 
this person?   
Yes / No 
i. What are your expectations from this 
person in the future? 
1. [Prompt] Did you talk about the 
expectations with this person or is it 
like the proverb “The hands wash 
each other turn by turn”? 
2. [Prompt] The proverb 
says….[proverb], so does that mean 
you expect them to give you the 
exact same thing in the future? 
3.  [Prompt] Or do you expect them to 
give something equivalent in the 
future?   
4. [Prompt] Apart from what we have 
discussed above, is there something 
else you expect from the person? 
Explicit24 / Not explicit 
 
Expectations associated with specific 
transfer / Expectations associated with 
relationship to person / Expectations 
associated with something else 
g. Can you describe what you thought about 
when deciding whether to help or not?   
Inductive 
i. When you considered whether to give 
them the transfer, did you think about 
times that this person had helped you in 
the past? 
Yes / No 
 
ii. When you considered whether to give 
them the transfer, did you think about this 
person’s potential to help you in the 
future?   
1. [Prompt] Can you tell me more about 
what you thought about? 
Did they consider the return on their 
investment, the person’s capacity to 
make good use of the transfer?25   
iii. Did you consider not giving the person 
anything?  
Yes / No 
1. If so, why? 
2. If not, why not? 
Yes / No 
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26 See earlier footnote (Clarke and Dercon 2009). 
iv. What would have happened to you if 
you had decided to not help the person?  
1. [Prompt] Would there be any 
consequences among your family or 
friends? 
2. [Prompt] Would there be any 
consequences in the future if you fall 
into hard times? 
Consequence26 / No consequence 
v. Apart from the things we have discussed, 
what other things did you consider when 
making the decision?   
Inductive 
  
Section E:  Group Participation 
Now I would like to ask you about any cooperatives or other groups that you participate in.   
21. I see that your household members participate in 
[groups].  [If no group participation, skip to 4.] 
 
a. Which group is the most helpful to your 
household?  
Inductive 
b. Can you tell me about who is in this group 
and what it does? 
 
i. [Prompt] Who are the members? 
ii. [Prompt] What are [most helpful 
group]’s activites? 
iii. [Prompt] What are the conditions of 
membership? 
Conditional membership / 
unconditional membership 
 
Activites: 
Ex ante prep for shock (idiosyncratic, 
covariate) / Ex-post response to shock 
(idiosyncratic, covariate) / non-
insurance purpose 
c. Can you tell me about the ways that 
participating in [most helpful group] helps 
your household? 
vi. [Prompt] Can you tell me about a specific 
time when the group has helped you? 
Ex ante prep for shock (idiosyncratic, 
covariate) / Ex-post response to shock 
(idiosyncratic, covariate) / non-
insurance purpose 
h. Can you tell me about the ways that the 
group has helped its members? 
i. [Prompt] Can you describe a time when a 
group member asked for help and the 
group decided to help that person? 
Ex ante prep for shock (idiosyncratic, 
covariate) / Ex-post response to shock 
(idiosyncratic or covariate) / non-
insurance purpose 
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27 Informal insurance groups may experience adverse selection where membership is voluntary and the 
wealthy have alternative means of coping with shocks.  Alternately, poorer members may choose not to 
join informal groups where the conditions of membership are not affordable to the household 
(Bhattamishra and Barrett 2009, Morduch 1999). 
28 Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett (2011), Bhattamishtra and Barrett (2009), Santos and Barrett (2011), 
Morduch (1999) and others note that wealth and social connectedness are associated with access to 
informal insurance networks.  
 
ii. [Prompt] Can you describe what the group 
considered when deciding whether to help 
that person? 
Person’s previous contribution to group 
/ Person’s future potential contribution 
to group / Automatic decision—nothing 
to consider /  Other reasons 
i. Can you describe a time when a group 
member asked for help and the group 
decided not to help that person? 
i. [Prompt] What did the person want help 
for? 
ii. [Prompt] Why did the group decide not to 
help that person? 
 
 
Ex ante prep for shock (idiosyncratic, 
covariate) / Ex-post response to shock 
(idiosyncratic, covariate) / non-
insurance purpose 
 
Person’s previous contribution to group 
/ Person’s future potential contribution 
to group / Automatic decision—nothing 
to consider /  Other reasons 
j. In your opinion, do some group members 
benefit more from the group than others? 
 
k. Can you tell me about the ways that 
participating in [most helpful group] has 
helped other group members differently 
than the way you have been helped?   
 
Yes / No 
Ex ante prep for shock (idiosyncratic, 
covariate) / Ex-post response to shock 
(idiosyncratic, covariate) / non-
insurance purpose 
 
22. What groups, if any, do you feel you could join 
but you choose not to? 27 
 
a. Why do you opt to not join these groups? 
Inductive. 
 
Unable to meet conditions of 
membership / Would contribute more 
than receive / Other reasons 
23. Is there a group you wanted to join but were 
unable? 28 
 
l. If so, can you tell me the story of what 
happened? 
i. [Prompt] Why did you want to join? 
ii. [Prompt] Did you not have enough money 
to join? 
iii. [Prompt] Were you not close to the right 
people to be able to join? 
Wealth / social connectedness / other 
reasons.   
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iv. [Prompt] What were other reasons why 
you couldn’t join? 
24. Are there households that would like to join or 
maintain participation in [most helpful group], 
but are unable to do so?   
a. What do you think keeps them from 
joining or participating? 
i. [Prompt] Do they not have enough 
money to join? 
ii. [Prompt] Are they not close to the right 
people to be able to join? 
iii. [Prompt] What are other reasons why 
they can’t join? 
Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
25. Do you think it is most difficult to join [most 
helpful group] for people who are married, 
widowed or divorced?   
Married / Widowed / Divorced / All are 
the same 
b. What do you think are the reasons for this? Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
26. Do you think it is easiest to join [most helpful 
group] for people who are married, widowed or 
divorced?   
Married / Widowed / Divorced / All are 
the same 
c. What do you think are the reasons for this? Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
27. Do you think it is easier to join [most helpful 
group] for people who are rich or poor? 
Rich / Poor / Neither 
d. [Prompt, if rich] Is there something more 
than money that makes it easy for wealthy 
people to be part of this group? 
e. [Prompt, if poor] What makes it easier for 
poor people to join the most helpful group? 
  Wealth alone / Social connectedness / 
Other reasons? 
 
 
Inductive. 
28. Compared to others, do you think it is relatively 
easy or difficult for members of your household 
to join and maintain participation in [groups]?   
Easy / Hard 
f. What makes you think this way? 
g. [Prompt] Can you give me an example of 
something that demonstrates that it is 
[easier/harder] for your household? 
Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
 
[Questions below are for households that did not report participation in any groups in R3] 
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Section D:  Perceptions of Informal Insurance  
I would like to hear about how easy or difficult it is to get help from others when facing hard 
times.  For example, during drought, famine or health problems or a death in the family…. 
31. When you compare yourself to other households, 
do you feel it is easier or harder for your 
household to get help from others during hard 
times?   
Yes / No 
h. Why do you think it’s easier/harder for 
your household? 
Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
i. [Prompt] Can you give an example of a 
time that that it was easier/harder for 
your household?   
Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
i. When you compare yourself to other 
households, what kinds of problems are 
easier for your household to get help with?   
Idiosyncratic / Covariate 
29. Many households participate in different kinds 
of groups like women’s groups, savings groups 
or others, but I see you reported that nobody in 
your household is involved in this.  Is that still 
the case? 
 
30. If so, why is your household not involved in any 
of these groups? [If not, return to previous 
section] 
Access difficulty (wealth, social 
connectedness, other) / No access 
difficulty 
 
m. Have you wanted to join a group and been 
unable?  If so, can you tell me the story of 
what happened? 
i. [Prompt] Why did you want to join? 
ii. [Prompt] Why were you not able to join? 
iii. [Prompt] Did you not have enough money 
to join? 
iv. [Prompt] Were you not close to the right 
people to be able to join? 
v. [Prompt] What were other reasons why 
you couldn’t join? 
Unable to meet conditions of group due 
to wealth / social connectedness / other 
reasons.   
n. Are there groups that you feel you could 
join, but you choose not to? 
Yes / No 
i. Can you tell me a bit about why you 
choose not to? 
Inductive 
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j. When you compare yourself to other 
households, what kinds of problems are 
more difficult?  
32. Why do you think it is easier for some 
households and harder for others to get help 
during hard times?   
Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
k. [Prompt] Can you describe types of 
households that appear to find it easier to 
get help?  
Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
l. [Prompt] Can you describe types of 
households that appear to find it more 
difficult?   
Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
m. Do you think it is most difficult to get help 
during hard times for people who are 
married, widowed or divorced?  
Married / Widowed / Divorced / All are 
the same 
i. What do you think are the reasons for 
this?   
1. [Prompt] Do you think it is related to 
their money/livestock/wealth?  
[wealth=qabann] 
2. [Prompt] Do you think it’s related to 
their social network? 
3. [Prompt] What other reasons might 
make it most difficult for them? 
Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
n. Do you think it’s easiest to get help during 
hard times for people who are married, 
widowed or divorced? 
Married / Widowed / Divorced / All are 
the same 
i. What do you think are the reasons for 
this? 
1. [Prompt] Do you think it is related to 
their money/livestock/wealth? 
2. [Prompt] Do you think it’s related to 
their social network? 
3. [Prompt] What other reasons might 
make it easiest for them? 
Wealth / Social connectedness / Other 
reasons? 
o. When a generally more rich person falls 
into hard times, is it easier or more difficult 
to get help from others than a generally 
poorer person? 
Rich / Poor 
i. What do you think are the reasons for 
this? 
1. [Prompt, if they say it’s easier for 
richer people] Is there something 
Wealth alone / Social connectedness / 
Other reasons? 
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more than money that helps wealthy 
people get help from others during 
hard times? 
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APPENDIX D:  Additional Results 
 
 
Table D1: IBLI Purchase Decision (Coefficient Estimates) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household 0.040 0.699* 1.028 
 (0.096) (0.357) (0.787) 
Female Head X HS at marriage   0.469 
   (0.710) 
HS at marriage   0.190 
   (0.139) 
Female Head X Home info  -0.0004 0.011 
  (0.005) (0.009) 
Home-centered information  0.003 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Female Head X Transfers  -0.089 -0.250** 
  (0.061) (0.123) 
ln Transfers  -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.030) (0.031) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion  -0.309 -0.455 
  (0.210) (0.399) 
Moderate risk aversion  0.039 0.039 
  (0.099) (0.102) 
Female Head X High risk aversion  -0.067 -1.875 
  (0.335) (1.524) 
High risk aversion  -0.113 -0.141 
  (0.154) (0.159) 
IBLI knowledge  0.102*** 0.091*** 
  (0.025) (0.028) 
Financial literacy  0.093*** 0.118*** 
  (0.036) (0.042) 
Head Education  -0.031 -0.038 
  (0.025) (0.026) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.522*** -0.550*** -0.553*** 
 (0.055) (0.059) (0.064) 
Lagged IBLI purchase  -0.387*** -0.320** 
  (0.127) (0.139) 
Assigned coupon 0.277** 0.266** 0.228 
 (0.127) (0.134) (0.144) 
Dependency ratio -0.118 -0.098 -0.283* 
 (0.094) (0.099) (0.153) 
Expected rangeland above normal 0.027 0.084 0.042 
 (0.149) (0.157) (0.181) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.309** 0.309** 0.357** 
 (0.127) (0.134) (0.149) 
Previous period losses -0.178** -0.217** -0.233** 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.095) 
Age  -0.195 -0.156 
  (0.119) (0.154) 
Age-squared  0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset index  -0.142 -0.106 
  (0.090) (0.097) 
ln Total monthly income  -0.051 -0.121** 
  (0.046) (0.052) 
Proportion of income from livestock  -0.007*** -0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
ln Herd size  -0.029 0.071 
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  (0.140) (0.165) 
Savings > 5 TLU  0.076 0.135 
  (0.200) (0.213) 
HA Dependency ratio 0.049 0.058 0.026 
 (0.047) (0.052) (0.070) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal -0.036 -0.079 -0.015 
 (0.206) (0.219) (0.247) 
HA Expected rangeland below normal -0.074 -0.156 -0.080 
 (0.170) (0.184) (0.208) 
HA Previous period losses 0.130 -0.030 -0.064 
 (0.103) (0.138) (0.152) 
HA Age  -0.011 -0.006 
  (0.014) (0.016) 
HA Age-squared  0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index  -0.011 0.058 
  (0.110) (0.122) 
HA ln Total monthly income  0.087 0.085 
  (0.097) (0.119) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock  -0.002 -0.005 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
HA ln Herd size  0.051 0.101 
  (0.099) (0.117) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU  0.073 0.053 
  (0.249) (0.269) 
Constant 1.074*** -0.000 -0.121 
 (0.391) (0.249) (0.269) 
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,510 
Chi2 362.3 630.2 574.2 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table D2: IBLI Purchase Decision Using Reported Purchase (Coefficient Estimates) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household 0.057 0.346 0.427 
 (0.086) (0.319) (0.697) 
Female Head X HS at marriage   0.524 
   (0.546) 
HS at marriage   0.181 
   (0.120) 
Female Head X Home info  -0.0004 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.008) 
Home-centered information  -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Female Head X Transfers  -0.064 -0.113 
  (0.054) (0.108) 
ln Transfers  -0.002 0.003 
  (0.026) (0.026) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion  -0.062 -0.044 
  (0.184) (0.348) 
Moderate risk aversion  -0.059 -0.056 
  (0.086) (0.087) 
Female Head X High risk aversion  -0.236 -1.019 
  (0.292) (1.035) 
High risk aversion  -0.053 -0.072 
  (0.131) (0.134) 
IBLI knowledge  0.146*** 0.137*** 
  (0.022) (0.025) 
Financial literacy  0.030 0.020 
  (0.031) (0.035) 
Head Education  -0.021 -0.021 
  (0.021) (0.022) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.174*** -0.150*** -0.142*** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) 
Lagged IBLI purchase  0.400*** 0.391*** 
  (0.093) (0.103) 
Assigned coupon 0.329*** 0.355*** 0.379*** 
 (0.099) (0.103) (0.112) 
Dependency ratio -0.055 -0.042 -0.088 
 (0.082) (0.087) (0.128) 
Expected rangeland above normal -0.185 -0.093 -0.138 
 (0.129) (0.136) (0.152) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.024 0.017 0.033 
 (0.110) (0.116) (0.126) 
Previous period losses -0.118 -0.118 -0.147* 
 (0.074) (0.076) (0.081) 
Age  -0.086 0.029 
  (0.097) (0.110) 
Age-squared  0.001 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset index  -0.080 -0.106 
  (0.066) (0.078) 
ln Total monthly income  -0.016 -0.073 
  (0.042) (0.046) 
Proportion of income from livestock  -0.004** -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
ln Herd size  0.012 0.041 
  (0.122) (0.138) 
Savings > 5 TLU  0.071 0.045 
  (0.170) (0.179) 
HA Dependency ratio 0.020 -0.005 -0.023 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.060) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal 0.011 0.041 0.099 
 (0.182) (0.190) (0.211) 
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HA Expected rangeland below normal -0.014 -0.020 0.033 
 (0.150) (0.158) (0.176) 
HA Previous period losses 0.142 -0.033 -0.063 
 (0.091) (0.120) (0.130) 
HA Age  -0.014 -0.013 
  (0.012) (0.014) 
HA Age-squared  0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index  0.079 0.030 
  (0.087) (0.101) 
HA ln Total monthly income  -0.023 -0.069 
  (0.081) (0.098) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock  -0.002 -0.004 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
HA ln Herd size  0.082 0.139 
  (0.086) (0.099) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU  0.320 0.444* 
  (0.214) (0.229) 
Constant -0.495* -0.770 -0.633 
 (0.277) (0.214) (0.229) 
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,510 
Chi2 65.83 128.0 105.7 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table D3: IBLI Purchase Decision Using Reported Purchase (AME) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household 0.017 0.099 0.122 
 (0.025) (0.091) (0.199) 
Female Head X HS at marriage   0.150 
   (0.156) 
HS at marriage   0.052 
   (0.034) 
Female Head X Home info  0.001 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Home-centered information  -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Female Head X Transfers  -0.018 -0.032 
  (0.016) (0.031) 
ln Transfers  -0.001 0.001 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion  -0.018 -0.012 
  (0.053) (0.099) 
Moderate risk aversion  -0.017 -0.016 
  (0.025) (0.025) 
Female Head X High risk aversion  -0.067 -0.291 
  (0.083) (0.295) 
High risk aversion  -0.015 -0.021 
  (0.038) (0.038) 
IBLI knowledge  0.042*** 0.039*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Financial literacy  0.009 0.006 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
Head Education  -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.041*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Lagged IBLI purchase  0.114*** 0.112*** 
  (0.027) (0.029) 
Assigned coupon 0.098*** 0.102*** 0.108*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) 
Dependency ratio -0.016 -0.012 -0.025 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.037) 
Expected rangeland above normal -0.055 -0.027 -0.039 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.043) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.007 0.005 0.009 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) 
Previous period losses -0.035 -0.034 -0.042* 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Age  -0.025 0.008 
  (0.028) (0.032) 
Age-squared  0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset index  -0.023 -0.030 
  (0.019) (0.022) 
ln Total monthly income  -0.005 -0.021 
  (0.012) (0.013) 
Proportion of income from livestock  -0.001** -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
ln Herd size  0.003 0.012 
  (0.035) (0.040) 
Savings > 5 TLU  0.020 0.013 
  (0.049) (0.051) 
HA Dependency ratio 0.006 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal 0.003 0.012 0.028 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.060) 
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HA Expected rangeland below normal -0.004 -0.006 0.009 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) 
HA Previous period losses 0.042 -0.009 -0.018 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.037) 
HA Age  -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
HA Age-squared  0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index  0.023 0.009 
  (0.025) (0.029) 
HA ln Total monthly income  -0.007 -0.020 
  (0.023) (0.028) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock  -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
HA ln Herd size  0.023 0.040 
  (0.024) (0.028) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU  0.092 0.127* 
  (0.061) (0.065) 
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,510 
LR Chi2 121.8 220.7 197.7 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table D4:  Level of Purchase Using Reported Purchase 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household -0.128 0.162 -0.270 
 (0.126) (0.383) (0.928) 
Female Head X HS at marriage   1.159* 
   (0.660) 
HS at marriage   0.106 
   (0.151) 
Female Head X Home info  0.001 0.007 
  (0.005) (0.011) 
Home-centered information  -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Female Head X Transfers  -0.016 -0.026 
  (0.063) (0.134) 
ln Transfers  -0.037 -0.044 
  (0.030) (0.033) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion  -0.199 -0.366 
  (0.210) (0.422) 
Moderate risk aversion  -0.071 -0.087 
  (0.099) (0.107) 
Female Head X High risk aversion  -0.066 -2.232* 
  (0.346) (1.243) 
High risk aversion  -0.003 0.016 
  (0.153) (0.168) 
IBLI knowledge  0.168*** 0.170*** 
  (0.051) (0.055) 
Financial literacy  0.059 0.061 
  (0.036) (0.043) 
Head Education  -0.042 -0.049* 
  (0.026) (0.029) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.424*** -0.341*** -0.337*** 
 (0.088) (0.060) (0.065) 
Lagged IBLI purchase  0.341** 0.329** 
  (0.148) (0.167) 
Dependency ratio -0.091 -0.065 -0.165 
 (0.131) (0.112) (0.162) 
Expected rangeland above normal -0.235 -0.039 -0.142 
 (0.202) (0.160) (0.196) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.102 0.125 0.116 
 (0.160) (0.133) (0.155) 
Previous period losses -0.133 -0.171* -0.168 
 (0.115) (0.094) (0.110) 
Age  -0.080 0.014 
  (0.111) (0.144) 
Age-squared  0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset index  -0.076 -0.107 
  (0.094) (0.118) 
ln Total monthly income  -0.005 -0.053 
  (0.049) (0.062) 
Proportion of income from livestock  -0.004 -0.003 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
ln Herd size  -0.031 0.063 
  (0.148) (0.179) 
Savings > 5 TLU  -0.377** -0.359* 
  (0.189) (0.210) 
HA Dependency ratio -0.005 -0.041 -0.091 
 (0.060) (0.052) (0.071) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal 0.036 0.045 0.144 
 (0.261) (0.218) (0.258) 
HA Expected rangeland below normal -0.146 -0.163 -0.132 
 (0.216) (0.181) (0.219) 
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HA Previous period losses 0.371*** -0.149 -0.153 
 (0.140) (0.136) (0.156) 
HA Age  -0.025* -0.025 
  (0.015) (0.017) 
HA Age-squared  0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index  0.036 -0.029 
  (0.118) (0.147) 
HA ln Total monthly income  -0.107 -0.111 
  (0.095) (0.121) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock  -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
HA ln Herd size  0.390*** 0.384*** 
  (0.099) (0.123) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU  0.262 0.455 
  (0.259) (0.312) 
Constant 1.157** 1.314 1.239 
 (0.579) (0.847) (0.965) 
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,510 
Chi2 65.83 128.0 105.7 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table D5: IBLI Purchase Decision Using Cases Where OIC Records=Reported Purchase (Coeff. Estimates) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household 0.020 0.752* 0.934 
 (0.106) (0.390) (0.871) 
Female Head X HS at marriage   0.686 
   (0.831) 
HS at marriage   0.232 
   (0.149) 
Female Head X Home info  -0.0004 0.012 
  (0.005) (0.010) 
Home-centered information  0.001 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Female Head X Transfers  -0.102 -0.230 
  (0.067) (0.153) 
ln Transfers  -0.005 -0.001 
  (0.033) (0.034) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion  -0.405* -0.717 
  (0.235) (0.444) 
Moderate risk aversion  0.056 0.065 
  (0.110) (0.113) 
Female Head X High risk aversion  -0.271 -2.038 
  (0.393) (1.749) 
High risk aversion  -0.208 -0.236 
  (0.177) (0.184) 
IBLI knowledge  0.145*** 0.133*** 
  (0.029) (0.033) 
Financial literacy  0.095** 0.100** 
  (0.040) (0.047) 
Head Education  -0.053* -0.052* 
  (0.029) (0.031) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.581*** -0.604*** -0.617*** 
 (0.073) (0.078) (0.086) 
Lagged IBLI purchase  -0.308** -0.295* 
  (0.151) (0.167) 
Assigned coupon 0.349** 0.354** 0.331* 
 (0.151) (0.160) (0.173) 
Dependency ratio -0.123 -0.100 -0.276 
 (0.103) (0.110) (0.174) 
Expected rangeland above normal -0.013 0.068 0.065 
 (0.167) (0.179) (0.205) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.300** 0.312** 0.317* 
 (0.140) (0.150) (0.167) 
Previous period losses -0.229** -0.268*** -0.306*** 
 (0.095) (0.099) (0.108) 
Age  -0.310** -0.212 
  (0.147) (0.173) 
Age-squared  0.002* 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset index  -0.127 -0.125 
  (0.100) (0.109) 
ln Total monthly income  -0.029 -0.089 
  (0.051) (0.056) 
Proportion of income from livestock  -0.007*** -0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
ln Herd size  -0.027 0.045 
  (0.154) (0.179) 
Savings > 5 TLU  0.104 0.162 
  (0.225) (0.239) 
HA Dependency ratio 0.038 0.037 0.010 
 (0.052) (0.058) (0.079) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal 0.015 0.014 0.023 
 (0.228) (0.246) (0.277) 
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HA Expected rangeland below normal 0.026 -0.025 0.061 
 (0.191) (0.210) (0.237) 
HA Previous period losses 0.120 -0.105 -0.139 
 (0.117) (0.156) (0.173) 
HA Age  -0.026* -0.018 
  (0.015) (0.018) 
HA Age-squared  0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index  0.018 0.074 
  (0.122) (0.136) 
HA ln Total monthly income  0.068 -0.021 
  (0.110) (0.134) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock  -0.004 -0.008* 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
HA ln Herd size  0.125 0.238* 
  (0.111) (0.132) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU  0.054 0.078 
  (0.278) (0.302) 
Constant 1.137** 0.422 0.901 
 (0.501) (0.278) (0.302) 
Observations 1,581 1,581 1,305 
Chi2 232.6 325.9 300.8 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table D6:  Level of Purchase--Cases where OIC Records = Reported Purchase  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household -0.125 0.316 0.035 
 (0.078) (0.253) (0.609) 
Female Head X HS at marriage   0.337 
   (0.419) 
HS at marriage   -0.046 
   (0.077) 
Female Head X Home info  -0.002 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.008) 
Home-centered information  0.001 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Female Head X Transfers  -0.047 -0.051 
  (0.042) (0.095) 
ln Transfers  -0.001 -0.009 
  (0.022) (0.023) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion  -0.207 -0.450 
  (0.150) (0.282) 
Moderate risk aversion  0.040 0.008 
  (0.066) (0.068) 
Female Head X High risk aversion  0.148 -0.746 
  (0.245) (0.914) 
High risk aversion  0.012 0.014 
  (0.113) (0.122) 
IBLI knowledge  0.060** 0.067*** 
  (0.024) (0.026) 
Financial literacy  0.019 0.018 
  (0.026) (0.030) 
Head Education  -0.053*** -0.056*** 
  (0.019) (0.020) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.515*** -0.395*** -0.393*** 
 (0.072) (0.046) (0.046) 
Lagged IBLI purchase  -0.128 -0.151 
  (0.092) (0.100) 
Dependency ratio 0.111 0.116 0.128 
 (0.093) (0.086) (0.113) 
Expected rangeland above normal 0.044 0.090 0.092 
 (0.129) (0.111) (0.126) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.160 0.054 0.053 
 (0.117) (0.099) (0.110) 
Previous period losses -0.118 -0.098 -0.085 
 (0.080) (0.069) (0.075) 
Age  -0.020 -0.075 
  (0.070) (0.097) 
Age-squared  0.000 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset index  -0.142* -0.175** 
  (0.084) (0.089) 
ln Total monthly income  -0.018 -0.028 
  (0.030) (0.034) 
Proportion of income from livestock  -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
ln Herd size  -0.058 -0.008 
  (0.107) (0.125) 
Savings > 5 TLU  -0.132 -0.133 
  (0.133) (0.140) 
HA Dependency ratio 0.035 0.009 -0.012 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.045) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal -0.083 -0.026 0.046 
 (0.170) (0.148) (0.162) 
HA Expected rangeland below normal -0.236* -0.220* -0.206 
 (0.140) (0.121) (0.137) 
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HA Previous period losses 0.330*** 0.011 0.044 
 (0.091) (0.100) (0.109) 
HA Age  -0.017* -0.022* 
  (0.010) (0.011) 
HA Age-squared  0.000 0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index  -0.083 -0.111 
  (0.097) (0.108) 
HA ln Total monthly income  -0.018 -0.044 
  (0.069) (0.081) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock  0.002 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
HA ln Herd size  0.216*** 0.223*** 
  (0.072) (0.083) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU  0.019 0.063 
  (0.160) (0.179) 
Constant 2.870*** 2.542*** 2.868*** 
 (0.202) (0.531) (0.575) 
Observations 1,581 1824 1510 
Chi2 256.3 460.0 423.0 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table D7: IBLI Purchase Decision--Cases Where OIC Records = Reported Purchase  (AME) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household 0.004 0.136* 0.166 
 (0.022) (0.070) (0.155) 
Female Head X HS at marriage   0.122 
   (0.147) 
HS at marriage   0.041 
   (0.027) 
Female Head X Home info  0.0002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Home-centered information  0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Female Head X Transfers  -0.018 -0.041 
  (0.012) (0.027) 
ln Transfers  -0.001 -0.0001 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion  -0.073* -0.127 
  (0.042) (0.079) 
Moderate risk aversion  0.010 0.011 
  (0.020) (0.020) 
Female Head X High risk aversion  -0.049 -0.361 
  (0.071) (0.308) 
High risk aversion  -0.038 -0.042 
  (0.032) (0.033) 
IBLI knowledge  0.026*** 0.024*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
Financial literacy  0.017** 0.018** 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Head Education  -0.010* -0.009* 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.119*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
Lagged IBLI purchase  -0.056** -0.052* 
  (0.027) (0.030) 
Assigned coupon 0.072** 0.064** 0.059** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) 
Dependency ratio -0.025 -0.018 -0.049 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.031) 
Expected rangeland above normal -0.003 0.012 0.012 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.036) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.062** 0.056** 0.056* 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) 
Previous period losses -0.047** -0.048*** -0.054*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Age  -0.056** -0.038 
  (0.026) (0.031) 
Age-squared  0.00004* 0.0003 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset index  -0.023 -0.022 
  (0.018) (0.019) 
ln Total monthly income  -0.005 -0.016 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
Proportion of income from livestock  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
ln Herd size  -0.005 0.008 
  (0.028) (0.032) 
Savings > 5 TLU  0.019 0.029 
  (0.041) (0.042) 
HA Dependency ratio 0.008 0.007 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal 0.003 0.002 0.004 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.049) 
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HA Expected rangeland below normal 0.005 -0.005 0.011 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.042) 
HA Previous period losses 0.025 -0.019 -0.025 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.031) 
HA Age  -0.005* -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
HA Age-squared  0.0001 0.00002 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index  0.003 0.013 
  (0.022) (0.024) 
HA ln Total monthly income  0.012 -0.004 
  (0.020) (0.024) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock  -0.001 -0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
HA ln Herd size  0.023 0.042* 
  (0.020) (0.023) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU  0.010 0.014 
  (0.050) (0.054) 
Observations 1,581 1,581 1,305 
LR Chi2 232.6 325.9 300.8 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table D8:  IBLI Purchase Decision--Alternative Bargaining Model Specifications (Coeff. Estimates) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household 1.028 1.622* 1.383 
 (0.787) (0.910) (0.935) 
Female Head X HS at marriage 0.469   
 (0.710)   
HS at marriage 0.190   
 (0.139)   
Female Head X Current HS  0.058  
  (1.635)  
Percentage of cattle herd that is HS  -0.038  
  (0.269)  
Female Head X Lactating Herd   0.150 
   (0.703) 
ln Lactating herd proportion   -0.035 
   (0.131) 
Female Head X Home info 0.011 0.004 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) 
Home-centered information 0.003 0.000 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Female Head X Transfers -0.250** -0.300* -0.258** 
 (0.123) (0.159) (0.122) 
ln Transfers -0.005 0.046 -0.005 
 (0.031) (0.048) (0.031) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion -0.455 -0.404 -0.535 
 (0.399) (0.499) (0.388) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.039 0.090 0.031 
 (0.102) (0.135) (0.101) 
Female Head X High risk aversion -1.875 -5.502 -0.959 
 (1.524) (0.000) (0.960) 
High risk aversion -0.141 0.053 -0.118 
 (0.159) (0.196) (0.156) 
IBLI knowledge 0.091*** 0.045 0.090*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.028) 
Financial literacy 0.118*** 0.079 0.123*** 
 (0.042) (0.053) (0.041) 
Head Education -0.038 -0.022 -0.037 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.553*** -0.613*** -0.561*** 
 (0.064) (0.079) (0.063) 
Lagged IBLI purchase -0.320** -0.122 -0.317** 
 (0.139) (0.153) (0.139) 
Assigned coupon 0.228 0.173 0.210 
 (0.144) (0.193) (0.143) 
Dependency ratio -0.283* -0.151 -0.275* 
 (0.153) (0.191) (0.152) 
Expected rangeland above normal 0.042 -0.042 0.028 
 (0.181) (0.233) (0.179) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.357** 0.230 0.350** 
 (0.149) (0.190) (0.148) 
Previous period losses -0.233** -0.331** -0.227** 
 (0.095) (0.138) (0.094) 
Age -0.156 -0.041 -0.161 
 (0.154) (0.204) (0.156) 
Age-squared 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Asset index -0.106 -0.065 -0.103 
 (0.097) (0.104) (0.097) 
ln Total monthly income -0.121** -0.046 -0.115** 
 (0.052) (0.088) (0.051) 
Proportion of income from livestock -0.007*** -0.004 -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
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ln Herd size 0.071 0.016 0.101 
 (0.165) (0.218) (0.166) 
Savings > 5 TLU 0.135 0.101 0.132 
 (0.213) (0.270) (0.209) 
HA Dependency ratio 0.026 0.049 0.045 
 (0.070) (0.090) (0.069) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal -0.015 -0.116 -0.040 
 (0.247) (0.316) (0.244) 
HA Expected rangeland below normal -0.080 -0.073 -0.085 
 (0.208) (0.266) (0.207) 
HA Previous period losses -0.064 -0.232 -0.041 
 (0.152) (0.203) (0.151) 
HA Age -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) 
HA Age-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index 0.058 0.221 0.052 
 (0.122) (0.143) (0.122) 
HA ln Total monthly income 0.085 0.182 0.069 
 (0.119) (0.165) (0.118) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock -0.005 -0.013*** -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
HA ln Herd size 0.101 0.196 0.081 
 (0.117) (0.158) (0.118) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU 0.053 -0.150 0.046 
 (0.269) (0.343) (0.262) 
Constant -0.121 -0.341 0.093 
 (0.914) (1.219) (0.916) 
Observations 1,510 1,134 1,526 
chi2 574.2 385.9 597.3 
Prob > Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
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Table D9:  Level of Purchase--Alternative Bargaining Model Specifications  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household -0.254 -0.354 -0.522 
 (0.572) (0.767) (0.659) 
Female Head X HS at marriage 0.325   
 (0.357)   
HS at marriage -0.036   
 (0.072)   
Female Head X Current HS  0.606  
  (0.652)  
Percentage of cattle herd that is HS  0.020  
  (0.166)  
Female Head X Lactating Herd   -0.488 
   (0.422) 
ln Lactating herd proportion   0.166** 
   (0.077) 
Female Head X Home info 0.004 0.008 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
Home-centered information 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female Head X Transfers 0.003 0.008 0.015 
 (0.073) (0.109) (0.073) 
ln Transfers 0.003 0.025 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion -0.312 -0.314 -0.436* 
 (0.238) (0.330) (0.233) 
Moderate risk aversion -0.029 -0.101 -0.029 
 (0.058) (0.072) (0.057) 
Female Head X High risk aversion -0.678 (omitted) -0.193 
 (0.792) (omitted) (0.497) 
High risk aversion 0.037 0.042 -0.009 
 (0.103) (0.118) (0.099) 
IBLI knowledge 0.041** 0.047* 0.034* 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.020) 
Financial literacy -0.004 0.065** -0.007 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.026) 
Head Education -0.057*** -0.048** -0.053*** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.356*** -0.423*** -0.359*** 
 (0.040) (0.052) (0.041) 
Lagged IBLI purchase -0.059 0.033 -0.054 
 (0.080) (0.082) (0.079) 
Dependency ratio 0.093 0.102 0.122 
 (0.101) (0.133) (0.101) 
Expected rangeland above normal 0.111 0.182 0.122 
 (0.103) (0.122) (0.101) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.017 -0.143 0.008 
 (0.100) (0.112) (0.098) 
Previous period losses -0.030 -0.106 -0.024 
 (0.061) (0.088) (0.060) 
Age -0.099 -0.120 -0.138 
 (0.087) (0.093) (0.085) 
Age-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset index -0.173** -0.081 -0.162** 
 (0.078) (0.080) (0.076) 
ln Total monthly income -0.016 -0.090 -0.015 
 (0.032) (0.066) (0.031) 
Proportion of income from livestock 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
ln Herd size -0.031 0.029 0.018 
 (0.115) (0.145) (0.113) 
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Savings > 5 TLU -0.165 -0.358** -0.173 
 (0.123) (0.157) (0.120) 
HA Dependency ratio -0.031 -0.054 -0.019 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.038) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal -0.006 -0.290 -0.019 
 (0.143) (0.187) (0.140) 
HA Expected rangeland below normal -0.284** -0.317** -0.278** 
 (0.118) (0.154) (0.117) 
HA Previous period losses 0.023 -0.017 0.032 
 (0.092) (0.114) (0.091) 
HA Age -0.009 -0.021* -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
HA Age-squared 0.000 0.0001* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index -0.100 -0.182* -0.080 
 (0.093) (0.110) (0.092) 
HA ln Total monthly income -0.079 -0.156 -0.089 
 (0.071) (0.101) (0.069) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
HA ln Herd size 0.207*** 0.207** 0.233*** 
 (0.074) (0.102) (0.073) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU 0.240 0.430** 0.215 
 (0.158) (0.210) (0.151) 
Constant 3.083*** 3.220*** 3.323*** 
 (0.523) (0.734) (0.521) 
Observations 1,510 1,134 1,526 
chi2 574.2 385.9 597.3 
Prob > Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
  
 
Table D10:  IBLI Purchase Decision--Alternative Bargaining Model Specifications (AME) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Female headed household 0.209 0.226* 0.283 
 (0.161) (0.127) (0.191) 
Female Head X HS at marriage 0.096   
 (0.144)   
HS at marriage 0.039   
 (0.028)   
Female Head X Current HS  0.008  
  (0.228)  
Percentage of cattle herd that is HS  -0.005  
  (0.038)  
Female Head X Lactating Herd   0.031 
   (0.144) 
ln Lactating herd proportion   -0.007 
   (0.027) 
Female Head X Home info 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Home-centered information 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female Head X Transfers -0.051** -0.042* -0.053** 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) 
ln Transfers -0.001 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Female Head X Moderate risk aversion -0.093 -0.056 -0.110 
 (0.081) (0.070) (0.079) 
Moderate risk aversion 0.008 0.013 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) 
Female Head X High risk aversion -0.382 (omitted) -0.196 
 (0.309) (omitted) (0.196) 
High risk aversion -0.029 0.007 -0.024 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.032) 
IBLI knowledge 0.019*** 0.006 0.018*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Financial literacy 0.024*** 0.011 0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Head Education -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
ln Effective price per TLU -0.113*** -0.085*** -0.115*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Lagged IBLI purchase -0.065** -0.017 -0.065** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.028) 
Assigned coupon 0.046 0.024 0.043 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) 
Dependency ratio -0.058* -0.021 -0.056* 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) 
Expected rangeland above normal 0.009 -0.006 0.006 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.037) 
Expected rangeland below normal 0.073** 0.032 0.072** 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) 
Previous period losses -0.048** -0.046** -0.047** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age -0.032 -0.006 -0.033 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.032) 
Age-squared 0.00002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset index -0.022 -0.009 -0.021 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) 
ln Total monthly income -0.025** -0.006 -0.023** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Proportion of income from livestock -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
  
 
ln Herd size 0.014 0.002 0.021 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) 
Savings > 5 TLU 0.028 0.014 0.027 
 (0.043) (0.038) (0.043) 
HA Dependency ratio 0.005 0.007 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
HA Expected rangeland above normal -0.003 -0.016 -0.008 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.050) 
HA Expected rangeland below normal -0.016 -0.010 -0.017 
 (0.042) (0.037) (0.042) 
HA Previous period losses -0.013 -0.032 -0.008 
 (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) 
HA Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
HA Age-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HA Asset index 0.012 0.031 0.011 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) 
HA ln Total monthly income 0.017 0.025 0.014 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
HA Proportion of income from livestock -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HA ln Herd size 0.021 0.027 0.017 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) 
HA Savings > 5 TLU 0.011 -0.021 0.009 
 (0.055) (0.048) (0.054) 
Observations 1,510 1,128 1,526 
LR Chi2 574.2 385.9 597.3 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
